A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games by Luca Anderlini et al.








Abstract. We analyze dynastic repeated games. These are repeated games
in which the stage game is played by successive generations of ﬁnitely-lived players
with dynastic preferences. Each individual has preferences that replicate those of the
inﬁnitely-lived players of a standard discounted inﬁnitely-repeated game. Individuals
live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes place before their
birth, but instead create social memory through private messages received from their
immediate predecessors.
Under mild conditions, when players are suﬃciently patient, all feasible payoﬀ vec-
tors (including those below the minmax of the stage game) can be sustained by Sequen-
tial Equilibria of the dynastic repeated game with private communication. The result
applies to any stage game with n ≥ 4 players for which the standard Folk Theorem
yields a payoﬀ set with a non-empty interior.
We are also able to characterize fully the conditions under which a Sequential Equi-
librium of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoﬀ vector not sustainable as a
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the standard repeated game. For this to be the case
it must be that the players’ equilibrium beliefs violate a condition that we term “Inter-
Generational Agreement.”
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1. Introduction
This paper establishes a “Super Folk Theorem” for dynastic repeated games. Dynastic re-
peated games are repeated games with periodic generational replacement. In these games,
society is inhabited by sequences of generationally linked individuals. In each sequence or
dynasty, a ﬁnitely lived decision maker is eventually replaced by a successor who has no di-
rect knowledge of the past before his entry into the game. The members of a dynasty are
linked by concerns for the future welfare of the group or organization. Examples include
tribes, families, ethnic groups, or ﬁrms.1 These ongoing organizations outlive any particular
individual who occupies decision authority in the group at a particular point in time.
If all individuals in all dynasties could perfectly observe the past history of play, then the
dynastic game and the standard repeated game are equivalent (in Subgame Perfect equilibria).
However, because no individual person in a dynasty can directly observe events that occurred
before his “birth,” he must rely on a private messages from his predecessor to form beliefs
about the past history of play. This intergenerational communication forms a signiﬁcant part
of a society’s “social memory” at any given point in time.
Our main result indicates a stark diﬀerence between the dynastic repeated games and the
standard repeated game model. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that in a broad class of games (which
includes every n ≥ 4-player game for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoﬀ set
with a non-empty interior), as individuals become more and more altruistic (patient), every
interior payoﬀ vector in the convex hull of the payoﬀs of the stage game can be sustained
by a Sequential Equilibrium (henceforth SE) of the dynastic repeated game with private
communication.
The logic of this “Super Folk Theorem” relies on the possibility that individuals system-
atically misinterpret their predecessors’ messages indicating past deviations from within the
dynasty. These individuals therefore remain unaware of the ensuing punishment phase, and
hence are unable to protect themselves against it.
Even though our main result applies to inﬁnite repetitions of a stage game with four
players or more, we begin with an illustrative example involving a two-player game played
twice. (We return to the 4-player assumption for our main result shortly.) This is deliberately
designed to be as simple as possible while still allowing the basic phenomenon underlying our
main results to take place.
1In the cases of ﬁrms, one may not think of managers in ﬁrms as “altruistic.” However, stock options and
other incentive contracts help to align the manager’s interests with those of the ﬁrm’s.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 2




sA 4,4 −5,6 1,3
sB 6,−5 3,3 −10,2
sC 3,1 2,−10 0,0
At the end of the ﬁrst period, the two individuals who play the game in the ﬁrst round are
replaced by their successors, who play in the second period. There is no discounting: Each
ﬁrst period “father” cares about his “son’s” payoﬀ as if it were his own. The second period
players only care about their own payoﬀs.
Consider only pure strategies for now. It is clear that if the sons could observe the ﬁrst
period actions, then the only Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (henceforth SPE) is one in which
(sB,sB) is played twice. Suppose, however, that a son cannot observe play in t = 1, but
instead receives a private message from his father. We claim that there exists an SE in which
(sA,sA) is played in the ﬁrst round. In other words, a non-Nash proﬁle is sustainable in the
ﬁrst period. This is so despite the fact that in the standard model the unique stage Nash
equilibrium leaves no room for punishment in the second period.
The argument is as follows. Consider an SE in which two messages are used: m∗ indicates
a message of “no deviation,” while mD indicates “someone’s father deviated.” The equilib-
rium prescribes that in the ﬁrst period each father plays “sA.” He then sends m∗ to his son
if (sA,sA) was played, and sends mD otherwise. Each son, upon observing the message from
his father, plays sB in the second round if he observes m∗ and plays sC if instead he sees mD.
But how can each son justify playing “sC” after observing the oﬀ-path message mD? For
this to be the case, each son’s beliefs must be mismatched to the other son’s actions. In any
SE, oﬀ-path beliefs must satisfy a well known consistency criterion. Namely, they must be
the limit of a sequence of beliefs derived from a commonly shared theory of mistakes or errors
(“trembles”). Hence, consider the following error structure in the ﬁrst period actions of the
fathers. Each father is believed to have erred in the action stage by playing sB or sC with
probability ε/4 each. He is also believed to have sent the wrong message with probability ε.
Given these error likelihoods, if a son receives message mD he will believe that his opponent
has received mD or m∗ with probability 1/2 each. His best response in this case is “sC.” Since
(sC,sC) provides an eﬀective deterrent in the second period against deviation from (sA,sA),
each father will choose the prescribed action sA in the ﬁrst period.
The fact that sC is a best response to “wrong” beliefs highlights how diﬀerent the model
is from standard cheap talk games. Messages are not simply “babbled” or garbled. Instead,
the “mismatch” of beliefs to actions depends critically on the way the consistency criterion
of SE actually works out. This criterion is much more than a technical artifact of SE. AsLuca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 3
the example illustrates, the consistency criterion provides an important social theory of belief
formation. Namely, it requires that all individuals have a complete and shared theory of the
mistakes that might have caused deviations from equilibrium — a society’s outlook governing
how “surprises” should be interpreted.
As in the example, the Super Folk Theorem utilizes this shared theory of mistakes. When
an individual in the guilty dynasty receives an oﬀ-path message, he must weigh the possibility
of a message error by his father against the possibility of his father’s truthful report of an
earlier action deviation by the father or some other ancestor in the dynasty.
We note that the result applies to games requiring 4 or more dynasties. Why? Roughly
speaking, the result makes use of local punishments resembling Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
punishment phases. According to these, a dynasty is singled out for punishment following
a deviation by some perpetrator within the dynasty. If there were only three dynasties,
then two of them must carry out the punishment against the third. Suppose one deviates
from this duty. How could a new entrant determine which if any punishment phase should
be followed? The problem does not arise with n ≥ 4 since any deviation from among the
remaining 3 punishers can be readily identiﬁed by the other two.2
A second result establishes that the type of mismatch in beliefs in the Super Folk theorem
is equivalent to saying that an SE violates Inter-Generational Agreement, a notion that relates
end-of-period beliefs of the fathers to beginning-of-period beliefs of the sons. We are able
to show that any SPE of the standard repeated game can be replicated as an SE of the
dynastic repeated game that displays Inter-Generational Agreement. Conversely any SE of
the dynastic repeated game that yields a payoﬀ vector that is not sustainable as an SPE of
the standard repeated game must violate Inter-Generational Agreement.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we lay down the notation
and details of the canonical dynastic repeated game in which each cohort of individuals live
only one period. The Theorems are proved for this canonical case, but we later discuss in our
conclusions (Section 7) how they generalize to games with arbitrary (bounded) demographics.
In Section 3 we deﬁne what constitutes an SE for the Dynastic Repeated Game. In Sections
4 and 5 we present our “Super” Folk Theorem and other results. Section 6 reviews some
related literature, and Section 7 concludes.
For ease of exposition, and for reasons of space, no formal proofs appear in the main body
of the paper. The main ingredients (public randomization devices, strategies and trembles)
for the proof of our extended Folk Theorem (Theorem 1) appear in Appendix A. The complete
proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix B. A technical addendum to the paper contains the
rest of the formal proofs.3
2It should be emphasized that we are not claiming that our results are false when the stage game has 2 or
3 players. Simply that the (constructive) proof of our main result below relies on the assumption that n ≥ 4.
In fact, under some additional conditions, in Anderlini, Gerardi, and Lagunoﬀ (2004) we prove a Super Folk
Theorem for stage games with three players or more.
3The technical addendum is available at http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/FolkAddendum.pdf.
In the numbering of equations, Lemmas etc. a preﬁx of “A” or “B” means that the item is located in theA “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 4
2. The Model
The stage game is described by the array G = (A,u,I) where I = {1,...,n} is the set of
players, indexed by i. The n-fold cartesian product A = ×i∈IAi is the set of pure action
proﬁles a = (a1,...,an) ∈ A, assumed to be ﬁnite. Stage game payoﬀs are deﬁned by
u = (u1,...,un) where ui : A → IR for each i ∈ I. Let σi ∈ ∆(Ai) denote a mixed strategy
for i, with σ denoting the proﬁle (σ1,...,σn).4 We extend the use of ui(·) to mixed strategies
in the usual way and hence we write ui(σ) for i’s expected payoﬀ given the proﬁle σ. Dropping
the i subscript and writing u(σ) gives the entire proﬁle of expected payoﬀs.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we denote by V the convex hull of the set of payoﬀ
vectors from pure strategy proﬁles in G. We let intV denote the (relative) interior of V .
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,2,... In the dynastic repeated game, each i ∈ I
indexes an entire progeny of individuals. We refer to each of these as a dynasty. Individuals
in each dynasty are assumed to live one period. At the end of each period t (the beginning
of period t + 1), a new individual from each dynasty — the date (t + 1)-lived individual —
is born and replaces the date t lived individual in the same dynasty. We refer to each date
t-lived individual in dynasty i simply as player hi,ti.
The realized action proﬁle at time t is denoted by at. The stage game payoﬀ ui(at) now
refers to the time t component of the payoﬀ of player hi,ti. Each player hi,ti is altruistic
in the sense that his payoﬀ includes the discounted sum of the direct payoﬀs of all future
individuals in the same dynasty. The players’ (common for simplicity) discount factor is
δ ∈ (0,1). Player hi,ti gives weight 1−δ to ui(at), and weight (1−δ)δτ to ui(at+τ) for every
τ ≥ 1. So, the (dynastic) payoﬀ to player hi,ti is (1 − δ)
P∞
τ=0 δτui(at+τ).
At the beginning of period t, player hi,ti receives a private message mt
i from player hi,t−1i.
He does not directly observe anything about the previous history of play. The ﬁnite set of
possible messages mt
i is denoted by Mt
i. We will return to the latter shortly. It should also
be noted at this point that our results would survive intact if we allowed public messages as
well as private ones. The equilibria we construct below would still be viable, with the public
messages ignored.5
In each period, all players observe the realizations xt and yt of two public randomization
devices ˜ xt and ˜ yt. The realization xt is observed at the action stage, immediately after each
player hi,ti observes mt
i. The realization yt is observed at the message stage, immediately
before each player hi,ti sends message m
t+1
i .6 These devices are independent and i.i.d. across
corresponding Appendix.
4As is standard, here and throughout the rest, given any ﬁnite set Z, we let ∆(Z) be the set of all
probability distributions over Z.
5Dealing explicitly with both private and public messages would be cumbersome, and make our results
considerably less transparent. Analyzing the model with private messages only is the most economical way
to put our main point across, and hence this is how we proceed.
6 We return to the role of correlation devices in Section 7. Working with two separate correlation devices
simpliﬁes our arguments and, in our view, facilitates an intuitive understanding of our results. However,
it should be noted that our main result and its proof survives literally unchanged if we assume that bothLuca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 5
periods; we write ˜ x and ˜ y to indicate the random variables of which all the ˜ xts and ˜ yts are
independent “copies.” We refer to ˜ x and ˜ y respectively as the action-stage correlation device
and the message-stage correlation device. The random variables ˜ x and ˜ y have full support
and take values in the ﬁnite sets X and Y respectively, so that their distributions are points
in ∆(X) and ∆(Y ) respectively.
To summarize, at the beginning of each period t, player hi,ti receives a private message
mt
i from player hi,t − 1i. He then observes xt and subsequently chooses a (mixed) action to
play in G. After observing the realized action proﬁle at, he observes yt and then chooses a
(mixed) message m
t+1
i to send to player hi,t + 1i.
The action strategy of player hi,ti is denoted by gt
i. This determines the mixed strategy
that player hi,ti plays in the stage game at time t. In particular gt
i takes as input a message
mt
i ∈ Mt
i and a value xt ∈ X and returns a mixed strategy σt
i ∈ ∆(Ai).7 We write gt
i(mt
i,xt)
to indicate the mixed strategy σt
i ∈ ∆(Ai) that player hi,ti plays after observing the pair
(mt
i,xt).
The message strategy of player hi,ti is denoted by µt
i. It takes as inputs a message mt
i, the
realization xt, the realized action proﬁle at, the realized value yt, and returns the probability
distribution φt




i . We write µt
i(mt




i ) that player hi,ti sends player hi,t + 1i after observing the quadruple
(mt
i,xt,at,yt).
It is convenient to specify fully the ﬁnite message sets Mt
i at this point. The choice of
message spaces is to a large extent arbitrary since enlarging message spaces does not shrink
the set of SE payoﬀs, as Lemma T.2.1 demonstrates.8 We proceed in a way that allows
comparability with the standard repeated game model. Deﬁne ht = (x0,a0,...,xt−1,at−1),
with h0 = ∅ and the set of all possible hts denoted by Ht. From now on we take set of
messages M
t+1
i available to each player hi,ti to send to player hi,t+1i to be equal to Ht+1.9
Because of our choice of message spaces Mt




is exactly the same object that deﬁnes a strategy for player i in the standard model where
correlation devices are simultaneously observable to all players in each cohort at the action stage. In this
case, clearly a single correlation device would suﬃce.
7It should emphasized at this stage that nowhere in the paper we assume that mixed strategies are
observable. Whatever (mutually independent) devices the players use to achieve a desired randomization
among pure actions in G given mt
i and a realization of ˜ xt, remain unobservable to other players.
8This is because we can “replicate” any SE of the dynastic repeated game with smaller message spaces
as an SE of the dynastic repeated game with larger message spaces by mapping each message in the smaller
set to a ﬁnite set of messages in the larger message space. A choice of message in the smaller message space
corresponds to a (uniform) randomization over the entire corresponding set in the larger message space. A
player receiving one of the randomized messages in the larger message space acts just like the player who
receives the corresponding message in the smaller message set.
9Observe that our choice of message spaces implies that at t = 0 all players hi ∈ I,0i receive the “null”
message m0
i = ∅.
Notice also that we are excluding the relevant realized values yτ from the message space of player hi,ti.
This is without loss of generality because, as we noted above, enlarging the message spaces does not shrink
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G is played inﬁnitely many times by n inﬁnitely lived players who in each period t observe
the past history of play ht = (x0,a0,...,xt−1,at−1). This is immediate since each gt
i takes as
input an element of Ht and a value xt ∈ X, and returns a mixed strategy σt
i ∈ ∆(Ai).
In denoting proﬁles and sub-proﬁles of strategies we use standard notational conventions.
We let gi denote the i-th dynasty proﬁle (g0
i,g1
i,...,gt
i,...), while gt indicates the time t
proﬁle (gt
1,...,gt




i,...), as well as µt = (µt
1,...,µt
n) and µ = (µ1,...,µn). Therefore, the
pair (g,µ) entirely describes the behavior of all players in our model.
3. Sequential Equilibrium
Our focus is the set of SE of the model. The notion of SE is a widely accepted benchmark.
It is particularly well suited to dynastic games because it imposes a strong discipline on
how memory gets transmitted through time. This is because information transmission in a
dynastic game with private messages depends critically on the “interpretation” of oﬀ path
events; and how they may be due to message “mistakes” or action ones. In an SE, a society
must have a common outlook on the relative orders of magnitude of such mistakes.
While the original deﬁnition of SE in Kreps and Wilson (1982) does not readily apply
to games with inﬁnitely many players, only a minor adaptation of the concept is needed to
apply it to our set-up.
To spell it out, we begin with the observation that the beliefs of player hi,ti can in fact be
boiled down to a simpler object than one might expect at ﬁrst sight, because of the structure
of the dynastic repeated game. Upon receiving message mt
i, in principle, we would have to
deﬁne the beliefs of player hi,ti over the entire set of possible past histories of play. However,
when player hi,ti is born, an entire cohort of new players replaces the t−1-th one, and hence
the real history leaves no trace other than the messages (mt
1,...,mt
n) that have been sent
to cohort t. It follows that, without loss of generality, after player hi,ti receives message
mt
i we can restrict attention to his beliefs over the n − 1-tuple mt
−i of messages received by
other players in cohort t.10 This probability distribution, specifying the beginning-of-period
beliefs of player hi,ti, will be denoted by ΦtB
i (mt
i) throughout. When the dependence of this
distribution on mt
i can be omitted from the notation without causing any ambiguity we will
write it as ΦtB
i . The notation ΦtB






Consider now the two classes of information sets at which player hi,ti is called upon to
play: the ﬁrst deﬁned by a pair (mt
i,xt) when he has to select a mixed strategy σt
i, and the
second deﬁned by a quadruple (mt
i,xt,at,yt) when he has to select a probability distribution
φt
i over the set of messages Ht+1.
10It should be made clear that the beliefs of player hi,ti over mt
−i will in fact depend on the relative
likelihoods of the actual histories of play that could generate diﬀerent n − 1-tuples mt
−i. What we are
asserting here is simply that once we know the player’s beliefs over mt
−i, we have all that is necessary to
check that his behavior is optimal given his beliefs.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 7
The same argument as above now suﬃces to show that at the (mt
i,xt) information set we
can again restrict attention to he beliefs of player hi,ti over the n − 1-tuple mt
−i of messages
received by other players in cohort t. Moreover, since all players observe the same xt and this
realization is independent of what happened in the past, player hi,ti beliefs over mt
−i must
be the same as when he originally received message mt
i.
Finally, at the information set identiﬁed by the quadruple (mt
i,xt,at,yt), we can restrict
attention to the beliefs of player hi,ti over the n − 1-tuple m
t+1
−i of messages that the other
players in cohort t are about to send to cohort t + 1. Just as before, since all players are re-
placed by a new cohort and time-t payoﬀs have already been realized, this is all that could ever
matter for the payoﬀ to player hi,ti from this point on. This probability distribution, specify-
ing the end-of-period beliefs of player hi,ti, will be denoted by ΦtE
i (mt
i,xt,at,yt) throughout
the rest of the paper and the technical addendum. When the dependence of this distribution
on (mt
i,xt,at,yt) can be omitted from the notation without causing any ambiguity we will
write it as ΦtE
i . The notation ΦtE
i (·) will indicate the entire array of possible probability
distributions ΦtE
i (mt
i,xt,at,yt) as the quadruple (mt
i,xt,at,yt) varies.
In the proofs of our results, we will also need to refer to the (revised) end-of-period beliefs
of player hi,ti on the n − 1-tuple of messages mt
−i after he observes not only mt
i, but also
(xt,at,yt). These will be indicated by ΦtR
i (mt
i,xt,at,yt), with the arguments omitted when
this does not cause any ambiguity. The notation ΦtR
i (·) will indicate the entire array of
possible probability distributions ΦtR
i (mt
i,xt,at,yt) as the quadruple (mt
i,xt,at,yt) varies.
Throughout the rest of the paper we refer to the array Φ = {ΦtB
i (·),ΦtE
i (·)}t≥0,i∈I as a
system of beliefs. Following standard terminology we will also refer to a triple (g,µ,Φ), a
strategy proﬁle and a system of beliefs, as an assessment. Also following standard terminol-
ogy, we will say that an assessment (g,µ,Φ) is consistent if the system of beliefs Φ can be
obtained (in the limit) using Bayes’ rule from a sequence of completely mixed strategies that
converges to (g,µ). Since this is completely standard, for reasons of space we do not specify
any further details here.
Deﬁnition 1. Sequential Equilibrium: An assessment (g,µ,Φ) constitutes an SE for the dy-
nastic repeated game if and only if (g,µ,Φ) is consistent, and for every i ∈ I and t ≥ 0
strategy gt
i is optimal for player hi,ti given beliefs ΦtB
i (·), and strategy µt
i is optimal for the
same player given beliefs ΦtE
i (·).
4. A “Super” Folk Theorem
We anticipated that our “Super” Folk Theorem applies to a class of stage games that includes
all games with n ≥ 4 players for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoﬀ set with a
non-empty interior.
The class of stage games to which Theorem 1 below applies is larger — in a signiﬁcant
sense — than the one we just mentioned again. In essence, our result encompasses all stage
games that locally satisfy the conditions we have outlined.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 8
Before any formal deﬁnitions, an example will help bring out the point. Consider the
following simple 4-player version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which we will refer to as GP D.
Each player has two strategies labeled C and D. The payoﬀs to player i are ui(D,D,D,D)
= 0, ui(C,C,C,C) = 2, ui(D,C−i) = 3, ui(C,D−i) = −1, ui(D,Z−i) = 3 and ui(C,Z−i) =
−1, where Z−i is any string of length 3 that contains at least one C and one D. Clearly D
is a dominant strategy for every player in GP D, and the minmax payoﬀ vector is (0,0,0,0).
Moreover, the payoﬀ vector (2,2,2,2) strictly Pareto-dominates (0,0,0,0) and the convex hull
of payoﬀ vectors VP D has dimension 4. So, all the hypotheses of the standard Folk Theorem
are satisﬁed, and as a consequence our “Super” Folk Theorem applies to the dynastic repeated
game when the stage game is GP D.
Next, consider a new “augmented” version of GP D, which we refer to as GA, which is
derived from GP D by adding a third strategy H for each of the four players. The payoﬀs in
GA are as in GP D whenever all players play either C or D, and all players get a payoﬀ of 4
whenever one or more players play H. Clearly, the standard Folk Theorem does not yield
any equilibrium payoﬀ multiplicity in GA. This is because each player’s minmax payoﬀ in
GA is 4 — obtained by playing the dominant strategy H — and no vector of payoﬀs in V A
Pareto-dominates (4,4,4,4).
Our “Super” Folk Theorem does apply to the dynastic repeated game when the stage
game is GA. The reason is that, if we restrict attention to a subset of pure strategies for each
player (those yielding GP D), the hypotheses of the standard Folk Theorem apply and a payoﬀ
vector that strictly dominates the vector of minmax payoﬀs is in fact available. In short the
conditions necessary for the standard Folk Theorem to yield a payoﬀ set with a non-empty
interior apply “locally” to the stage game GA.
We now formalize these ideas in order to state formally our ﬁrst result. Given a stage
game G = (A,u,I), we indicate by ˜ A ⊆ A a typical set of pure action proﬁles with a product
structure. In other words, we require that there exist an array ( ˜ A1,..., ˜ An), with each ˜ Ai
containing at least two pure strategies, and with ˜ A = ×i∈I ˜ Ai. Given a product set ˜ A, we
denote by G
˜ A the normal form game in which each player’s pure strategy set is given by ˜ Ai.
Throughout, we refer to G
˜ A as a component game of G, and we denote the convex hull of
payoﬀs in G
˜ A by V ( ˜ A).
We are now ready to state our “Super” Folk Theorem.
Theorem 1. Dynastic Folk Theorem: Let a stage game G with four or more players be given.
Assume that G has a component game G
˜ A with the following two properties.11 First, there
exists a payoﬀ vector in G
˜ A that strictly Pareto-dominates the vector of minmax payoﬀs of
G
˜ A. Second, V ( ˜ A) has dimension n. Then for every v ∈ intV there exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such
that δ > δ implies v is sustained by a SE with discount factor δ.
The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive. In Appendix A we formally describe the random-
ization devices, the equilibrium strategies and the trembles that yield the equilibrium beliefs.
11Since ˜ A ⊆ A, the component game G
˜ A may be taken to be G itself.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 9
The rest of the argument, deriving equilibrium beliefs from the trembles via Bayes’ rule
and verifying sequential rationality, is available in sections T.3 through T.6 of the technical
addendum to the paper.12
In certain respects, the SE that we construct to prove Theorem 1 mirrors the intuition of
the Introductory Example. As in the example, a player hi,t−1i may want to communicate to
his successor hi,ti that dynasty i is being punished for having deviated, but will be unable to
do so in an eﬀective way. This is not due to an inability to communicate owing to a shortage
of possible messages, even if the message space we use in the proof is smaller than the set of
histories (see footnote 8). Rather, the correct interpretation is that in equilibrium there is no
message that player hi,ti might possibly interpret in the way that hi,t − 1i would like.13
We now sketch the proof of our “Super” Folk Theorem. Consider a stage game G =
(A,u,I) and a product set ˜ A ⊆ A yielding a component game G
˜ A satisfying the hypotheses
of Theorem 1. Denote by ωi( ˜ A) the minmax payoﬀ to player i in the component game G
˜ A.
Since V ( ˜ A) has dimension n, we can ﬁnd a ˆ v ∈ intV ( ˜ A) and an array of n payoﬀs vectors
v1,...,vn in V ( ˜ A) with the following properties. First, ωi( ˜ A) < vi
i < v
j
i, and second vi
i < ˆ vi
for every i ∈ I and every j 6= i.
For simplicity, assume that the payoﬀ vectors v1, ..., vn can all be obtained from pure
proﬁles of actions in ˜ A. Also for simplicity, assume that each of the payoﬀs ωi( ˜ A) can be
obtained from some pure proﬁle of actions in ˜ A.
The argument can be divided into two parts. First, we will argue that if δ is close to
one, it is possible to sustain the payoﬀ vector ˆ v ∈ V ( ˜ A) as an SE of the dynastic repeated
game. Notice that ˆ v ∈ V ( ˜ A) could well already be below the minmax payoﬀ in G for one
or more players. We call this the “local” part of the argument. Second, we will argue that
via a judicious use of the action-stage randomization device it is possible to go from the
local argument to a “global” one and sustain every feasible payoﬀ vector as required by the
statement of the theorem.
The equilibrium path generated by the strategies we construct consists of n+1 phases. We
12It should also be noted that the actual statement that we prove is stronger than Theorem 1 above. This
is reported below as Theorem A.1 in Appendix A. The statement of Theorem A.1 is stronger than that
of Theorem 1 in two respects. First, it does not not make explicit reference to the dimensionality of the
payoﬀ space of the component game G
˜ A, but refers to the existence of certain vectors of payoﬀs in it. This
makes explicit the fact that the dimensionality condition in the statement of Theorem 1 could be replaced
by a weaker “Non-Equivalent Utilities” condition (Abreu, Dutta, and Smith, 1994) on the payoﬀ space of
G
˜ A. Second, in Theorem A.1 the vector of minmax payoﬀs for the component game G
˜ A is deﬁned with the
following added twist (see Deﬁnition A.1). When minmaxing player i, the other players are allowed to choose
any correlated mixed strategies in G
˜ A, while player i is only allowed to choose a best reply in ˜ Ai, without
being able to condition on the same correlation device. In both cases, the weakened conditions of Theorem
A.1 make it applicable to a wider class of stage games. We have refrained from including these extensions to
Theorem 1 in the main body of the paper for reasons of space and of expository simplicity.
13At this point it is legitimate to wonder whether the concept of “neologism-proof” equilibrium (Farrell,
1993) has any impact on what we are saying here. While neologism-proofness in its current form does not
apply to our model, we return to this point at some length in Section 7 below.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 10
call the ﬁrst one the standard equilibrium phase, the second one the diversionary-1 equilibrium
phase, through to the diversionary-n equilibrium phase.
If all players hi ∈ I,ti receive message m∗ then play is in the standard equilibrium phase.
For simplicity again we proceed with our outline of the construction assuming that the equi-
librium prescribes that the players hi ∈ I,ti play a pure action proﬁle during the standard
equilibrium phase, denoted by a0. The associated payoﬀ vector is v0.
If all players j 6= i in the t-th cohort receive message ˘ mi, and player hi,ti receives any
message mi,τ in a ﬁnite set M(i,t) = {mi,1,...,mi,T} ⊂ Mt
i, then play is in the diversionary-i
phase.14 Let ai be the vector of actions (pure, for simplicity) for which i receives ωi( ˜ A) —
his minmax payoﬀ in the component game G
˜ A. During the diversionary-i equilibrium phase
player hi,ti plays action ai
i. For all players j 6= i, let ˘ ai
j be any action in ˜ Aj that is not equal
to ai
j. Such action can always be found since, by assumption, each ˜ Aj contains at least two
actions. During the diversionary-i equilibrium phase, any player j 6= i plays action ˘ ai
j. The
(per-period) payoﬀ vector associated with the diversionary-i equilibrium phase is denoted by
˘ ui.
If in period t play is in any of the equilibrium phases we have just described, and no
deviation occurs at the action stage, at the end of period t all players use the realization yt
of the message-stage randomization device to select the message to send to their successors.
The possible realizations of ˜ yt are (y(0),y(1),..., y(n)). The probability that yt = y(0) is
1 − η and the probability that yt = y(i) is η/n for every i ∈ I. Consider now the end of
any period t in any equilibrium phase, and assume that no deviation has occurred. If yt =
y(0) then all players hi ∈ I,ti send message m∗ to their successors, so play in period t + 1 is
in the standard equilibrium phase. If yt = y(i), then all players j 6= i send message ˘ mi to
their successors and player hi,ti sends a (randomly selected) message mi,τ ∈ M(i,t) to player
hi,t + 1i. So, in this case in period t + 1 play is in the diversionary-i equilibrium phase.
The proﬁles to be played in each diversionary-i equilibrium phase may of course be entirely
determined by the need to diﬀer from the component game minmax action proﬁles, so we have
no degrees of freedom there. However, we are free to choose the proﬁle a0 in constructing
the standard equilibrium phase. Recall that we take a0 to be pure solely for expositional
simplicity. Using the action-stage randomization device, clearly we could select correlated
actions for the standard equilibrium phase that yield any payoﬀ vector v0 in V ( ˜ A). Since ˆ v
∈ intV ( ˜ A) we can be sure that for some v0 ∈ V ( ˜ A) and some η ∈ (0,1)







So that (modulo our expositional assumption that v0 = u(a0)) when play is in any equilibrium
14In the formal proof the set of messages M(i,t) actually does depend on the time index t because not
all messages are available for the ﬁrst T periods of play. This is so in order to avoid any message space Mt
i
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phase the expected (across all possible realizations of ˜ yt) continuation payoﬀ to any player
hi,ti from the beginning of period t + 1 onward is ˆ vi.
The strategies we construct also deﬁne an oﬀ-path collection of n punishment phases
phases and n terminal phases, one of each type for each dynasty i. In the punishment-i
phase, in every period player i receives his component game minmax payoﬀ ωi( ˜ A) payoﬀ,
and the phase lasts T periods. In the terminal-i phase in every period the players receive
the vector of payoﬀs vi. The transition between any of the equilibrium phases and any of
the punishment or terminal phases is akin to the benchmark construction in Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986). In other words, a deviation by dynasty i during any of the equilibrium, any
of the punishment phases or any of the terminal phases triggers the start (or re-start) of the
punishment-i phase (deviations by two players or more are ignored). The terminal-i phase
begins after play has been, without subsequent deviations, in the punishment-i phase for T
periods. For an appropriately chosen (large) T, as δ approaches 1, with one critical exception,
the inequalities in (iii) of the statement of Theorem 1 are used in much the same way as in
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) to guarantee that no player deviates from the prescriptions of
the equilibrium strategies.
In Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), during the punishment-i phase player i plays a myopic
best response to the actions of other players. Critically, this is not the case here. During
the punishment-i phase dynasty i plays a best response to the strategy of others restricted
to the set of pure actions in ˜ Ai. Clearly this could be very far away (in per-period payoﬀ
terms) from an unconstrained best reply chosen at will within Ai. To understand how this
can happen in an SE we need to specify what message proﬁles mark the beginning of the
punishment-i phase and what the players’ beliefs are.
Suppose that player hi,ti deviates from the prescriptions of the equilibrium strategy and
triggers the start of the punishment-i phase as of the beginning of period t + 1. Then all
players hj ∈ I,ti send message mi,T to their successors. These messages are interpreted as
telling all players hj 6= i,t + 1i that the punishment-i phase has begun, and that there are
T periods remaining. We return to the beliefs of player hi,t + 1i from the guilty dynasty
shortly. In the following period of the punishment-i phase all players hj ∈ I,t + 1i send
message mi,T−1, then mi,T−2 and so on, so that the the index τ in a message mi,τ is eﬀectively
interpreted (by dynasties j 6= i) as a “punishment clock,” counting down how many periods
remain in the punishment-i phase.
The players’ beliefs in the SE we construct are “correct” in all phases of play except for the
beliefs of player hi,ti whenever play is in the punishment-i phase at time t. Upon receiving
any message mi,τ ∈ M(i,t), player hi,ti believes that play is in the punishment-i phase with
probability zero. Instead he believes that play is in the i-diversionary equilibrium phase
with probability one. This is possible in an SE because player hi,ti conﬂates any message
that might indicate the oﬀ-path punishment-i phase with the message indicating the on-path
diversionary-i phase. It follows easily that player hi,ti does not want to deviate from the
equilibrium strategies we have described when play is in the punishment-i phase.
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observed, player hi,ti will discover that play is in fact in the punishment-i phase, contrary to
his beginning-of-period beliefs, even if a new deviation occurs at the action stage of period
t. This is because, by construction, all players hj 6= i,ti play an action (namely ˘ ai
j) in the
diversionary-i equilibrium phase that is diﬀerent from what they play in the punishment-i
phase (namely ai
j). This, coupled with the assumption assumption that n ≥ 4 will ensure
that hi,ti will discover the truth, and the identity of any deviator.15
Therefore any player hi,ti who knows that in period t+1 play will be in the punishment-i
phase would like would like to “communicate eﬀectively” to player hi,t + 1i that play is in
the punishment-i phase but is unable to do so, as in our discussion above concerning message
spaces. After receiving mi,τ and discovering that play is in the punishment-i phase, sending
any message to player hi,t + 1i that is not mi,τ−1 may cause him, or some of his successors,
to deviate and hence to re-start the punishment-i phase.16 Sending mi,τ−1 will cause player
hi,t + 1i and his successors to play a best response among those that can be induced by any
available message. This is because ai
i is in fact a best response to the minmax (in ˜ Ai) of the
other players within the set ˜ Ai. Therefore, given the inequalities satisﬁed by ˆ v and v1,...,vn,
since T is suﬃciently large, and δ is close enough to one, no proﬁtable deviation is available
to player hi,ti.
The argument we have just outlined suﬃces to show that the payoﬀ vector ˆ v of the
statement of the theorem can be sustained as an SE of the dynastic repeated game. We now
argue that this fact can be used as a “local anchor” for our “global” argument that shows
that any interior payoﬀ vector can be sustained as an SE.
Fix any v∗ ∈ intV to be sustained in equilibrium. Since v∗ is interior it is obvious that it
can be expressed as v∗ = qˆ v + (1 − q)z for some q ∈ (0,1) and some z ∈ V . The “global”
argument then consists of using the action-stage randomization device so that in each period
with probability q play proceeds as in the construction above, while with probability 1 − q
the (expected) payoﬀ vector is z. The latter is achieved with action-stage strategies that do
not depend on the messages received. A deviation by i from the (correlated) actions needed
to implement z triggers the punishment-i phase. With one proviso to be discussed shortly,
it is not hard to then verify that this is suﬃcient to keep all players from deviating at any
point, and hence that v∗ can be sustained as an SE payoﬀ vector of the dynastic repeated
game for δ suﬃciently close to one.
The diﬃculty with the global argument we have outlined that needs some attention is easy
to point out. The periods in which the action-stage randomization device tells the players to
implement the payoﬀ vector z cannot be counted as real punishment periods. They in fact
15Clearly, if hi,ti could not be guaranteed to discover that play is in the punishment-i phase, or the identity
of any deviator at time t, then we could not construct strategies that guarantee that if hj 6= i,ti deviates
during the punishment-i phase then play switches to the punishment-j phase, as required.
16Checking sequential rationality at the message stage takes a few more steps than may appear from our
intuitive outline of the argument given here. This is because a deviation at the message stage may trigger
multiple deviations; that is deviations at the action and/or message stage by more than one successor of any
given player. The core of the argument dealing with this case is Lemma T.4.4 in the technical addendum.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 13
stochastically interlace all phases of play, including any punishment-i phase. However, the
length of eﬀective punishment T has to be suﬃciently large to deter deviations. The solution
we adopt is to ensure that the punishment clock does not decrease in any period in which
(with probability 1−q) the payoﬀ vector z is implemented at the action stage. In eﬀect, this
makes the length of any punishment-i phase stochastic, governed by a punishment clock that
counts down only with probability q in every period.
5. Inter-Generational (Dis)Agreement
Some of the SE of the dynastic repeated game we have identiﬁed in Theorem 1 above clearly
do not correspond in any meaningful sense to any SPE of the standard repeated game. This
is obvious if we consider an SE of the dynastic repeated game in which one or more players
receive a payoﬀ below their minmax value in the stage game G.
An obvious question to raise at this point is then the following. What is it that makes
these SE viable? To put it another way, can we identify any properties of an SE of the
dynastic repeated game which ensure that it must correspond in a meaningful sense to an
SPE of the standard repeated game? The answer is yes, and this is what this section of the
paper is devoted to.
The critical properties of an SE that we identify concern the players’ beliefs. These
properties characterize entirely the set of SE yielding payoﬀs outside the set of SPE of the
standard repeated game. Therefore, if one wanted to attempt to “reﬁne away” the equilibria
yielding payoﬀs outside the set of SPE, our results in this section pin down precisely which
belief systems the proposed reﬁnement would have to rule out.
The ﬁrst of the properties we identify is that a player’s (revised) beliefs at the end of the
period over the messages received by other players at the beginning of the period should be
the same as at the beginning of the period. This is equation (2) below. The second is that
the end-of-period beliefs of a player (over messages sent by his opponents) should be the same
as the beginning-of-period beliefs of his successor (over messages received by his opponents).
This is equation (3) below. In fact we are able to show that if this property holds for all
players (and all information sets) in an SE of the dynastic repeated game, then this SE must
be payoﬀ-equivalent to some SPE of the standard repeated game. For want of a better term,
when an SE of the dynastic repeated game has the two properties (of beliefs) that we just
described informally, we will say that it displays Inter-Generational Agreement.
Deﬁnition 2. Inter-Generational Agreement: Let an SE triple (g,µ,Φ) of the dynastic re-
peated game be given.
We say that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement if and only if for every i ∈ I,
t ≥ 0, mt
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and for every m
t+1















We are now ready to state our last result.
Theorem 2. SE of the Dynastic and SPE of the Standard Repeated Game: Fix a stage ga-
me G, any δ ∈ (0,1), and any ˜ x and ˜ y. Let (g,µ,Φ) be an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Assume that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Deﬁnition 2. Let v∗ be the
vector of (dynastic) payoﬀs for t = 0 players in this SE. Then v∗ is a SPE payoﬀ proﬁle of
the standard repeated game with the same discount factor δ.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix B. Before proceeding with an intuitive outline,
we state a remark on the implications of the theorem.
Clearly, Theorem 2 implies that if an SE payoﬀ vector v is not sustainable as by a SPE,
then it must be the case that no SE which sustains v in the dynastic repeated game displays
Inter-Generational Agreement. Moreover, it is fairly straightforward to show that any SPE
payoﬀ proﬁle can be sustained by an SE that satisﬁes Intergenerational Agreement (see
Anderlini, Gerardi, and Lagunoﬀ (2004), Theorem 1). Together with Theorem 2, this gives
us a complete characterization in payoﬀ terms of the relationship between the SE of the
dynastic and the SPE of the standard repeated game as follows.
For any G and δ ∈ (0,1), a payoﬀ proﬁle v is not sustained by a SPE if and only if any
SE that sustains v in the dynastic repeated game violates Inter-Generational Agreement.
To streamline the exposition of the outline of the argument behind Theorem 2, make the
following two simplifying assumptions. First, assume that at the message stage the players do
not condition their behavior at the message-stage on the randomization device. The simplest
way to ﬁx ideas here is to consider a message-stage randomization device with a singleton Y
(the set of possible realizations). Second, assume that all message-strategies µt
i are pure. In
other words, even though they may randomize at the action stage, all players at the message
stage send a single message, denoted µt
i(mt
i,xt,at), with probability one.17
Now consider an SE (g,µ,Φ) of the dynastic repeated game that satisﬁes Inter-Genera-
tional Agreement as in Deﬁnition 2. Fix any history of play ht = (x0,a0, ..., xt−1,at−1).
For each dynasty i, using the message strategies of players hi,0i through to hi,t−1i, we can
now determine the message mt
i that player hi,t − 1i will send to his successor, player (i,t).
Denote this message by mt
i(ht). Notice that mt
i(ht) can be determined simply by recursing
forward from period 0. Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players hi ∈ I,0i receive
message m0
i = ∅. Therefore, given h1 = (x0,a0), using µ0
i, we know m1
i(h1). Now using µ1
i we
17Abusing notation slightly, here and throughout, we will write gt
i(mt
i,xt) = ai to mean that the distribution
gt
i(mt




i to mean that the
distribution µt
i(mt
i,xt,at,yt) assigns probability one to m
t+1




i(h1),x1,a1), and so recursing forward the value of mt
i(ht) can
be worked out.
Because the SE (g,µ,Φ) satisﬁes Inter-Generational Agreement it must be the case that,
after any actual history of play (on or oﬀ the equilibrium path) ht, and therefore after receiving
message mt





n(ht)) with probability one.
To see why this is the case, we can recurse forward from period 0 again. Consider the end
of period 0. Since all players in the t = 0 cohort receive message ∅, after observing (x0,a0),
player hi,0i knows that any player hj 6= i,0i is sending message m1
j(x0,a0) = µ0
j(∅,x0,a0) to
his successor player hj,1i.
Equation (3) of Deﬁnition 2 guarantees that the beginning-of-period beliefs of player hi,1i
must be the same as the end-of-period beliefs of player hi,0i. So, at the beginning of period
1, player hi,1i believes with probability one that every player hj 6= i,1i has received message
m1
j(x0,a0) as above.
Equation (2) of Deﬁnition 2 guarantees that player hi,1i will not revise his beginning-
of-period beliefs during period 1. Therefore, after observing any (x1,a1), player hi,1i still
believes that every player hj 6= i,1i has received message m1
j(x0,a0) as above. But this,
via the message strategies µ1
j implies that player hi,1i must believe with probability one





successor hj,2i. Continuing forward in this way until period t we can then see that the
beginning-of-period beliefs of player hi,ti are as we claimed above.
Before we proceed to close the argument for Theorem 2, notice that both conditions
of Deﬁnition 2 are necessary for our argument so far to be valid. Intuitively, the forward
recursion argument we have outlined essentially ensures that the “correct” (because all its
members receive a given message m0
i = ∅) beliefs of the ﬁrst cohort “propagate forward” as
follows. At the beginning of period t = 1 each player hi ∈ I,1i must have correct beliefs
since the end-of-period beliefs of all players in period 0 are trivially correct, and equation (3)
of Deﬁnition 2 tells us that the end-of-period beliefs must be the same as the beginning-of-
periods beliefs of the next cohort. Now some pair (x1,a1) is observed by all players hi ∈ I,1i.
If this pair is consistent with their beginning-of-period beliefs, then clearly no player hi ∈ I,1i
can possibly revise his beliefs on the messages received by others at the beginning of period
1. However, if (x1,a1) is not consistent with the beliefs of players hi ∈ I,1i and their action
strategies, some players in the t = 1 cohort may be “tempted” to revise their beginning-of-
period beliefs. This is because an observed “deviation” from what they expect to observe
in period 1 can always be attributed to two distinct sources. It could be generated by
an actual deviation at action stage of period 1, or it could be the result of one (or more)
players in the t = 0 cohort having deviated at the message stage of period 0. Equation
(2) of Deﬁnition 2 essentially requires that the t = 1 players should always interpret an
“unexpected” pair (x1,a1) as an actual deviation at the action stage. The same applies to all
subsequent periods. So, while equation (3) of Deﬁnition 2 ensures that the initially correct
beliefs are passed on from one generation to the next, equation (2) of Deﬁnition 2 guaranteesA “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 16
that actual deviations will be treated as such in the beliefs of players who observe them.
The beliefs of players hi ∈ I,0i are correct and the end-of-period beliefs of any cohort are
guaranteed to be the same as the beginning-of-period beliefs of the next cohort by equation
(3). However, without equation (2) following an action deviation from the equilibrium path
the end-of-periods beliefs of some players hi,ti could be incorrect, and be passed on to the
next cohort intact.
Now recall that the punch-line of the forward recursion argument we have outlined is that
if the SE (g,µ,Φ) satisﬁes Inter-Generational Agreement then we know that after any actual





n(ht)) with probability one. To see how we can construct an SPE of
the standard repeated game that is equivalent to the given SE, consider the strategies gt∗
i for
the standard repeated game deﬁned as gt∗
i (ht,xt) = gt
i(mi(ht),xt). Clearly, these strategies
implement the same payoﬀ vector that is obtained in the given SE of the dynastic repeated
game. Now suppose that the strategy proﬁle g∗ we have just constructed is not an SPE of
the standard repeated game. Then, by the one-shot deviation principle we know that some
player i in the standard repeated game would have an incentive do deviate in a single period
t after some history of play ht. However, given the property of beliefs in the SE (g,µ,Φ)
with Inter-Generational Agreement that we have shown above, this implies that player hi,ti
would have an incentive to deviate at the action stage in the dynastic repeated game. This of
course contradicts the fact that (g,µ,Φ) is an SE of the dynastic repeated game. Hence the
argument is complete. The proof of Theorem 2 that appears in Appendix B of course does
not rely on the two simplifying assumptions we made here. However, modulo some additional
notation and technical issues, the argument presented there runs along the same lines as the
sketch we have given here.
6. Relation to the Literature
We do not attempt here to review the vast literature on repeated games.18 Instead, we
point out three key ingredients of our model which, taken together, set this paper apart
from previous contributions. First, we break inﬁnitely-lived players into sequences of ﬁnitely-
lived ones, each of whom has dynastic preferences. Second, the individual entrants have no
memory of past play, and the past history of play leaves no tangible trace — only messages
are available. Third, the messages within a dynasty from one generation of individuals to the
next are private.
Via the ﬁrst ingredient, the results of this paper to can be related those of overlapping
generations games. Examples of the latter include Cremer (1986), Kandori (1992a), Salant
(1991) and Smith (1992). In these papers there is no dynastic component to the players’
payoﬀs and full memory (i.e., perfect observation of the past) is assumed.19 Consequently,
18Mailath and Samuelson (2006) is a comprehensive source that includes classic as well as more recent
developments.
19As he points out, the results in Kandori (1992a) generalize to less than full memory of the past, although
some direct memory is required. Bhaskar (1998) examines a related OLG model with no dynastic payoﬀs andLuca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 17
the Folk Theorems for OLG games relate only to payoﬀ proﬁles above all players’ minmax
values.
The second and third ingredients, bring out the relationship with other recent papers
that study equilibria in dynastic environments when the full memory assumption is relaxed.
Examples include Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2005), Kobayashi (2003), and Lagunoﬀ and Matsui
(2004). Among these, Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2005) is the closest and, in many ways,
the most direct predecessor of the current paper. Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2005) examines
the same dynastic model when each player hi,ti receives a public messages from the player
hj ∈ I,t − 1i about the previous history of play. If the public messages from all player in
the previous cohort are simultaneous, then a Folk Theorem in the sense of Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986) can be obtained. If there are three or more players, all individually rational
feasible payoﬀs can be sustained as an SE. Intuitively, this is because a version of a well known
“cross-checking” argument that goes back to Maskin (1999) can be applied in this case. By
contrast, the present paper studies the model in which private communication (within each
dynasty) may occur. We show that the diﬀerence between purely public and possible private
communication is potentially large. Equilibria that sustain payoﬀs below some dynasty’s
minmax exist, but they require inter-generational “disagreement.”
Kobayashi (2003) and Lagunoﬀ and Matsui (2004) examine OLG games with a dynastic
payoﬀ component. As in Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2005), these models assume entrants have no
prior memory, and they also allow for communication across generations. Though substantive
diﬀerences exist between each of the models, they both prove standard (for OLG games) Folk
Theorems. Interestingly, both Folk Theorems make use of intra-generational disagreement of
beliefs in the equilibrium continuations following deviations. Nevertheless, the constructed
equilibria in both papers leave no room for inter-generational disagreement at the message
stage.
The role of public messages has been studied in other repeated game contexts such as
in games with private monitoring. Models of Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Compte
(1998), and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) all examine communication in repeated games
when players receive private signals of others’ past behavior. As in Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ
(2005), these papers exploit cross-checking arguments to sustain the truthful revelation of
one’s private signal in each stage of the repeated game.
Recent works by Schotter and Sopher (2001a), Schotter and Sopher (2001b), and Chaud-
huri, Schotter, and Sopher (2001) examine the role of communication in an experimental
dynastic environment. These papers report on laboratory experiments designed to mimic the
dynastic game. The general conclusion seems to be that the presence of private communica-
tion has a signiﬁcant (if puzzling) eﬀect, even in the full memory game.
It is also worth noting the similarity between the present model and games with imperfect
very little, albeit some, direct memory by entrants. He shows that very limited memory is enough to sustain
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recall.20 Each dynastic player could be viewed as an inﬁnitely lived player with imperfect
recall (e.g., the “absent-minded driver” with “multiple selves” in Piccione and Rubinstein
(1997)) who can write messages to his future self at the end of each period.
By contrast, the present model is distinguishable from dynamic models that create mem-
ory from a tangible “piece” of history. For instance, Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2005) extend
the analysis to the case where history may leave “footprint,” i.e, hard evidence of the past
history of play. Incomplete but hard evidence of the past history of play is also present in
Johnson, Levine, and Pesendorfer (2001) and Kandori (1992b). In another instance, mem-
ory may be created from a tangible but intrinsically worthless asset such as ﬁat money. A
number of contributions in monetary theory (e.g., Kocherlakota (1998), Kocherlakota and
Wallace (1998), Wallace (2001), and Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2001)) have all shown,
to varying degrees, the substitutability of money for memory.
7. Concluding Remarks
We posit a dynastic repeated game populated by one-period-lived individuals who rely on
private messages from their predecessors to fathom the past. The set of equilibrium payoﬀs
expands dramatically relative to the corresponding standard repeated game. Under extremely
mild conditions, as the dynastic players care more and more about the payoﬀs of their suc-
cessors, all interior payoﬀ vectors that are feasible in the stage game are sustainable in an SE
of the dynastic repeated game.
We are able to characterize entirely, via a property of the players’ beliefs, when an SE
of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoﬀ vector not sustainable as an SPE of the
standard repeated game: the SE in question must display a failure of what we have termed
Inter-Generational Agreement.
The consistency condition of SE provides a coherent societal outlook rooted in the like-
lihood of mistakes and how how such errors aﬀect oﬀ-path beliefs. We ﬁnd this discipline
particularly compelling in the dynastic context. For one thing, it provides an intuitive model
of how real world individuals might interpret oﬀ-path events. It also provides a natural lan-
guage for distinguishing between what people say (i.e., message errors) and what they do
(action errors). This paper shows how this dichotomy may give rise to systematically in-
correct beliefs after certain oﬀ-path events. In turn, these beliefs sustain SE payoﬀ proﬁles
below a player’s minmax.
We certainly recognize that there are other constructs that theorists are used to. The
obvious one is that of “neologism-proofness” (Farrell, 1993, Mattehws, Okuno-Fujiwara, and
Postlewaite, 1991, among others). As we mentioned earlier, at least in its current form,
neologism-proofness does not apply to our framework. The reason is as follows. Roughly
speaking, neologism-proofness builds into the solution concept the idea that in a sender-
receiver game, provided the appropriate incentive-compatibility constraints are satisﬁed, a
20See the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior (1997) on Games with Imperfect Recall for
extensive references.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 19
player’s exogenous type (in the standard sense of a “payoﬀ type”) will be able to create a
“neologism” (use an hitherto unused message) to distinguish himself from other types. The
point is that in our dynastic game there are no exogenous types for any of the players. It would
therefore be impossible to satisfy any standard form of incentive-compatibility constraints.
The diﬀerent “types” of each player in our dynastic repeated game are only distinguished
by their beliefs, which in turn are determined by equilibrium strategies together with a
complete theory of mistakes as in any SE. To see that the logic of neologism-proofness can
be conceptually troublesome in our context, consider for instance the construction we use
to prove Theorem 1 above. Suppose that some player hi,ti deviates so as to trigger the
punishment-i phase. At the end of period t player hi,ti may want to communicate to player
hi,t + 1i that play is in the punishment-i phase so that he can can play a best response
to the actions of others in period t + 1. For a “neologism” to work at this point player
hi,t + 1i would have to believe it. He would have to believe what player hi,ti is saying: I
have made a mistake, therefore respond appropriately to the punishment that follows (there
are no exogenous types to which hi,ti can appeal in his “speech”). However, as always in
a dynastic game, whether hi,t + 1i believes or not what he is told, depends on the relative
likelihood that he assigns to mistaken actions and mistaken messages; both are possible after
all.21 So, for the neologism to work it would have to be “trusted” more as a message than the
one prescribed in equilibrium. But, since there are no exogenous types to which to appeal,
there do not seem to be compelling reasons for this to be the case. As with other possible
reﬁnements, our characterization of the new equilibria that appear in the dynastic repeated
game in terms of Inter-Generational Agreement also seals the question of what bite a possible
adaptation of neologism-proofness could have at a more general level. The new equilibria of
the dynastic repeated game can be ruled out (without ruling out any of the traditional ones)
if and only if beliefs that violate Inter-Generational Agreement can be ruled out. Whether
this is the case or not is largely a matter of intuitive appeal.
While our results apply only to the actual formal model we have set forth, it is natural
to ask which ones are essential and which ones are not. We have several remarks to make.
As we noted already, the absence of public messages alongside private ones is completely
inessential to what we do here. Public messages could be added to our model without altering
our results. It is always possible to replicate the SE of this model in another model with public
messages as well; the public messages would be ignored by the players’ equilibrium strategies
and beliefs.
We make explicit use of public randomization devices both at the action and at the
message stage of the dynastic repeated game. While the use of two separate devices is not
essential for our results (see footnote 6 above), whether the use of some public randomization
device is necessary is a question for future research.22 In our constructions it is essential
21By contrast, in a sender-receiver game the sender communicates to the receiver his exogenous type, which
is chosen by Nature, and not by the sender himself.
22We have examples showing that even without any randomization devices it is possible to display SE that
push one or more dynasties below their minmax in the stage game. Whether a “Super” Folk Theorem isA “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 20
that the players should be able to correlate the messages they send to the next cohort.
Without this it is hard to see how play could switch between the diﬀerent phases on which
our constructions depend.
We have stipulated a very speciﬁc set of “demographics” for our dynastic repeated game:
all players live one period and are replaced by their successor at the end of their lives.
Although the demographic structure of the model greatly simpliﬁes the analysis, our results
readily generalize in the following sense. Suppose that each dynasty is composed of a sequence
of ﬁnitely lived individuals, each of whom can live any ﬁnite number of periods provided
that there exists a uniform upper bound L on the length of each lifetime. Note that any
overlap across dynasties that conforms to the L-boundedness assumption is possible. Using
a technique known at least since Ellison (1994), one can show that our results extend to
any L-bounded demographics. The idea involves constructing L interleaved “copies” of the
equilibrium of the one-period lived demographics case.
The actual history of play leaves no visible trace in our model. To what extent would our
results change if a (noisy or incomplete, or both) “footprint” of the past history of play were
available to the players? Intuitively this would make failures of Inter-Generational Agreement
harder to generate in equilibrium. Does the set of equilibria of the dynastic repeated game
shrink as the direct information about the past history of play that is available to the players
becomes more and more precise? While it seems plausible to conjecture that our results
would change across this range of possibilities, we have no option but to say that the topic
is worthy of future research.
In Anderlini, Gerardi, and Lagunoﬀ (2004), under some additional conditions on the
stage game, we prove a “Super” Folk Theorem for the case of three dynasties or more. It
is also not hard to construct examples of dynastic repeated games with two dynasties that
admit SE in which the players’ payoﬀs are below their minmax in the stage game. Thus,
it seems that there is no deﬁnite need to have more than two dynasties to generate SE
payoﬀs in the dynastic repeated game that are not sustainable as SPE of the corresponding
standard repeated game. Whether and under what conditions a Folk Theorem like the one
presented here is available for the case of two dynasties is an open question. We leave the
characterization of the equilibrium set in this case for future work.
Lastly, our Folk Theorems for the dynastic repeated game show that, as δ approaches one,
the set of SE payoﬀs includes “worse” vectors that push some (or even all) players below their
minmax payoﬀs in the stage game. We do not have a full characterization of the SE payoﬀs
for the dynastic repeated game when δ is bounded away from one. However, it is possible to
construct examples showing that the set of SE payoﬀs includes vectors that Pareto-dominate
those on the Pareto-frontier of the set of SPE payoﬀs in the standard repeated game when δ is
bounded away from one. Intuitively, this is because some “bad” payoﬀ vectors (pushing some
players below the minmax) are sustainable in an SE when δ is bounded away from one. Thus,
“harsher” punishments are available as continuation payoﬀs in the dynastic repeated game
available in this case is an open question at this point.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 21
than in the standard repeated game. Using these punishments, higher payoﬀs are sustainable
in equilibrium in the dynastic repeated game.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
A.1. A Stronger Statement
As we anticipated in the text, we show that Theorem 1 holds by proving a stronger statement, which readily
implies it.
We begin with a deﬁnition. As we mentioned in footnote 12, this re-deﬁnes the benchmark payoﬀs as the
minmax payoﬀs in the component game, but allowing for correlation among the minmaxing players while not
allowing the player who is being minmaxed to take the correlation into account.
Deﬁnition A.1. Restricted Correlated Minmax: Consider a stage game G = (A,u,I). Let a product set ˜ A
⊆ A be given. Now let







where z−i is any probability distribution over the ﬁnite set ˜ A−i (not necessarily the product of independent
marginals), and z−i(a−i) denotes the probability that z−i assign to the proﬁle a−i.
We then say that ωi( ˜ A) is the restricted (to ˜ A) correlated minmax for i in G.
The statement that we will actually prove can now be made precise.
Theorem A.1. Stronger Dynastic Folk Theorem: Let a stage game G = (A,u,I) with four or more players
be given. Assume that G is such that we can ﬁnd a product set ˜ A ⊆ A and an array of n+1 payoﬀs vectors
ˆ v,v1,...,vn for which the following conditions hold.
(i) For every i ∈ I, the set ˜ Ai contains at least two elements.
(ii) ˆ v ∈ intV ( ˜ A), and vi ∈ V ( ˜ A) for every i ∈ I.




i < ˆ vi for every i ∈ I and every j 6= i.
Then for every v ∈ intV there exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that δ > δ implies v is sustained by SE for discount
factor δ.
A.2. Outline Of The Argument
Our proof is constructive. It runs along the following lines. Given a v∗ ∈ int(V ), we construct a randomization
device ˜ x, a randomization device ˜ y, and an assessment (g,µ,Φ), which implements the vector of payoﬀs v∗,
and which for δ suﬃciently large constitutes an SE of the dynastic repeated game.
Notice that all the elements of our construction are deﬁned independently of δ. The sequential rationality
of the strategy proﬁle given the postulated beliefs holds when δ is suﬃciently close to one.
Throughout the argument, we assume that the message space for any player hi,t − 1i consists of a set
smaller than the set Ht. To work with “restricted message spaces is suﬃcient to prove our claim because of
Lemma T.2.1.
In Section A.3 we deﬁne formally the randomization devices ˜ x and ˜ y, the players’ message spaces Mt
i and
the proﬁle (g,µ). In Section A.4 we deﬁne the completely mixed strategies that generate the SE beliefs Φ.
The rest of the details are relegated to the technical addendum. In Section T.3 we deﬁne formally the
system of beliefs Φ. In Section T.4 we check that the assessment (g,µ,Φ) satisﬁes sequential rationality when
δ is close to one. Finally in Section T.5 we verify the consistency of the equilibrium beliefs.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 22
In what follows, v∗ ∈ int(V ) is the vector of payoﬀs to be sustained as an SE as in the statement of
Theorem A.1. Throughout the argument, ˜ A is a product set and ˆ v and v1 through vn are vectors of payoﬀs
as in the statement of Theorem A.1. Of course, these are ﬁxed throughout the proof.
A.3. Strategies, Randomization Devices and Message Spaces
Deﬁnition A.2: Let (a(1),...,a(`), ...,a(||A||)) be a list of all possible outcomes in G. Without loss of
generality, assume that the ﬁrst || ˜ A|| ≤ ||A|| elements in this enumeration are the strategy proﬁles in the
product set ˜ A. This enumeration will be taken as ﬁxed throughout the rest of the argument.
Remark A.1: From Deﬁnition A.1, for each i ∈ I we can ﬁnd a set of of proﬁles of actions ˜ Ai ⊂ ˜ A




`=1 adding up to one and such that










Without loss of generality, we can take it to be the case that for every i`, ai(i`) is the same action in ˜ Ai. We
denote this by ai
i so that ai(i`) = ai
i for ` = 1,...,|| ˜ Ai||.
For convenience, since ˜ A is ﬁxed throughout the argument, in what follows we will use the following











Of course, we have that ωi
i = ωi( ˜ A).
Deﬁnition A.3: Let ˜ Ai be as in Remark A.1. For each i ∈ I and for each element a(i`) of ˜ Ai, construct a
new action proﬁle ˘ ai(i`) as follows. For all j 6= i, set ˘ ai
j(i`) to satisfy ˘ ai
j(i`) 6= aj(i`) and ˘ ai
j(i`) ∈ ˜ Aj. Notice













Remark A.2: Since each of the payoﬀ vectors vj must only satisfy strong inequalities (see (iii) of the
statement of the theorem), without loss of generality we can take it to be the case that vj ∈ int(V ( ˜ A)), for
each j ∈ I. It then follows that for every j ∈ I we can ﬁnd a set of positive weights {pj(a(`))}
|| ˜ A||
`=1 adding up




|| ˜ A|| X
`=1
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Remark A.3: Since the payoﬀ vector ˆ v is in int(V ( ˜ A)), we can ﬁnd an η ∈ (0,1) and a set of positive weights
{ˆ p(a(`))}
|| ˜ A||
`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
ˆ vi = (1 − η)










Deﬁnition A.4: Throughout the rest of the argument we let
ˆ ˆ vi =
|| ˜ A|| X
`=1
ˆ p(a(`))ui(a(`)) (A.7)
where the weights {ˆ p(a(`))}
|| ˜ A||
`=1 are as in Remark A.3.
Remark A.4: Since the payoﬀ vector v∗ is in int(V ), we can ﬁnd a q ∈ (0,1) and a set of positive weights
{p∗(a(`))}
||A||
`=1 adding up to one and such that for every i ∈ I
v∗
i = (1 − q)
||A|| X
`=1
p∗(a(`))ui(a(`)) + q ˆ vi (A.8)
In what follows we will let zi =
P||A||
`=1 p∗(a(`))ui(a(`)).
Remark A.5: Recall that by assumption the payoﬀ vector v∗ is in int(V ). Therefore, we can ﬁnd a set of
positive weights {p0(a(`))}
||A||






Deﬁnition A.5. Action-stage Randomization Device: The action stage randomization device ˜ x is deﬁned as
follows. The set X consists of ||A|| || ˜ A||n+1 Q
i∈I || ˜ Ai|| + ||A||
2 elements.
Let (x(1),...,x(κ),...,x(||X||) be an enumeration of the elements of X, and let κ = ||A|| || ˜ A||n+1 Q
i∈I || ˜ Ai||.
Each of the ﬁrst κ elements of X can be identiﬁed by a string of 1 + (n + 1) + n = 2n + 2 indices as
follows. With a slight abuse of notation, for κ ≤ κ, we will write x(κ) = x(`0, ˆ `, `1,..., `n, 1`,..., i`,...,n`)
with `0 running from 1 to ||A||, ˆ ` and each of the indices `1 through `n running from 1 to || ˜ A||, and each of the
n indices i`, each with ` running from 1 to || ˜ Ai||. Obviously, the last ||X|| − κ elements of X can be identiﬁed
by a pair of indices `00 and `∗ both running from 1 to ||A||. In this case, with a slight abuse of notation again,
we will write x(κ) = x(`00,`∗).
We are now ready to deﬁne the probability distribution governing the realization of ˜ x. For κ ≤ κ let
Pr(˜ x = x(`0, ˆ `,`1,...,`n,1`,...,i`,...,n`)) =
q
h
p0(a(`0)) ˆ p(a(ˆ `))p1(a(`1)) · · · pn(a(`n))p1(a(1`)) · · · pi(a(i`)) · · · pn(a(n`))
i (A.10)
and for κ = κ + 1, ...,||X|| let
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Deﬁnition A.6. Message-Stage Randomization Device: The message stage randomization device ˜ y is de-
ﬁned as follows. The set Y consists of n + 1 elements, which we denote (y(0),y(1),...,y(n)). The random
variable ˜ y takes value y(0) with probability 1−η, and each of the other possible values with probability η/n.
Deﬁnition A.7: Throughout the rest of the argument, we let T be an integer suﬃciently large so as to
guarantee that the following inequality is satisﬁed for all i ∈ I.
T (vi
i − ωi
i) > ui − ui (A.12)
Deﬁnition A.8. Message Spaces: For each j ∈ I and each t = 1,...,T − 1 let
M(j,t) = {mj,T−t+1,mj,T−t+2,...,mj,T} (A.13)
and for every t ≥ T let
M(j,t) = M(j,T) = {mj,1,...,mj,T} (A.14)
Deﬁne also M = {m1,...,mn}, and ˘ M = {˘ m1,..., ˘ mn}, and recall that according to our notational convention
when we write ˘ M−i we mean {˘ m1,..., ˘ mi−1, ˘ mi+1, ˘ mn}.
Recall that Mt
i denotes the set of messages that a player hi,t − 1i can send to player hi,ti. For any t =
1,...,T let
Mt
i = {m∗} ∪ ˘ M−i ∪ M(1,t) ∪ ... ∪ M(n,t) (A.15)
For any t ≥ T + 1 let
Mt
i = {m∗} ∪ ˘ M−i ∪ M(1,t) ∪ ... ∪ M(n,t) ∪ M (A.16)
Deﬁnition A.9. Action-Stage Strategies: Let k be an element of I, and j be an element of I not equal to i.
Let (a(1),...,a(||A||)) be the enumeration of the elements of A of Deﬁnition A.2 and consider the index-
ation of the elements of X in Deﬁnition A.5, according to whether x(κ) has κ ≤ κ or not.
Recall that at the beginning of period 0 all players hi ∈ I,0i receive message m0
i = ∅. For all players





ai(`0) if x0 = x(`0,· · ·)
ai(`00) if x0 = x(`00,·)
(A.17)
Now consider any player hi,ti with t ≥ 1. It is convenient to distinguish between the two cases xt = x(κ)
with κ ≤ κ and with κ > κ.







ai(ˆ `) if mt




i = ˘ mj and xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·)
ai(`k) if mt
i = mk and xt = x(· · ·,`k,· · ·)
ai(k`) if mt
i ∈ M(k,t) and xt = x(· · ·,k`,· · ·)
(A.18)
23Notice that the third case in (A.18) can only possibly apply when t ≥ T + 1.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 25
For any i ∈ I, t ≥ 1 and mt
i, whenever xt = x(κ) with κ > κ deﬁne
gt
i(mt
i,xt) = ai(`∗) if xt = x(·,`∗) (A.19)
Deﬁnition A.10. Message-Stage Strategies: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not equal
to i.
We begin with period t = 0. Recall that m0





n,x0)), and deﬁne g0








˘ mj if a0 = g0(m0,x0) and y0 = y(j)








For the periods t ≥ 1 it is convenient to distinguish between several cases. Assume ﬁrst that xt = xt(κ)








i if xt = x(·,`∗) and at = a(`∗)
mk,T if xt = x(·,`∗), at




Now consider the case xt = xt(κ) with κ ≤ κ. We divide this case into several subcases, according to
which message player hi,ti has received. We begin with mt






˘ mj if xt = x(·, ˆ `,· · ·), at = a(ˆ `) and yt = y(j)
ν(M(i,t + 1)) if xt = x(·, ˆ `,· · ·), at = a(ˆ `) and yt = y(i)
mk,T if xt = x(·, ˆ `,· · ·), at
−k = a−k(ˆ `) and at
k 6= ak(ˆ `)
m∗ otherwise
(A.22)
Our next subcase of κ ≤ κ is that of mt
i = ˘ mj. With the understanding that j0 is any element of I not equal








if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·), at = ˘ aj(j`) and yt = y(j0)
ν(M(i,t + 1)) if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·), at = ˘ aj(j`) and yt = y(i)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·), at
−k = ˘ a
j
−k(j`) and at





Still assuming κ ≤ κ we now deal with the subcase mt




      
      
˘ mj if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·), at = ˘ ai(i`) and yt = y(j)
ν(M(i,t + 1)) if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·), at = ˘ ai(i`) and yt = y(i)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·), at
−k = ˘ ai
−k(i`) and at
k 6= ˘ ai
k(i`)





mi,τ−1 if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·) and at = a(i`)
m∗ otherwise
(A.24)
24Throughout the paper we adopt the following notational convention. Given any ﬁnite set, we denote by by ν(·) the uniform
probability distribution over the set. So, if Z is a ﬁnite set, ν(Z) assigns probability 1/||Z|| to every element of Z.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 26
where we set mi,0 = mi. Notice that player hi,ti may need to distinguish between the third and fourth cases
of (A.24) since clearly they may be generated by diﬀerent values of the index k ∈ I. To verify that this
distinction is always feasible, recall that, by construction (see Deﬁnition A.3), ˘ a−i(i`) diﬀers from a−i(i`) in
every component, and that of course n ≥ 4.
The next subcase of κ ≤ κ we consider is that of mt






mj,τ−1 if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·) and at = a(j`)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·,j`,· · ·), at




where we set mj,0 = mj.
Finally, still assuming that κ ≤ κ, we consider the case in which mt
i = mk
0










if xt = x(· · ·,`k0,· · ·) and at = a(`k0)
mk,T if xt = x(· · ·,`k0,· · ·), at




A.4. Completely Mixed Strategies
Deﬁnition A.11: Throughout this section we let ε denote a small positive number, which parameterizes
the completely mixed strategies that we construct. It should be understood that our construction of beliefs
involves the limit ε → 0.
Deﬁnition A.12. Completely Mixed Action Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all play-
ers hi,ti at the action stage are denoted by gt
i,ε and are deﬁned as follows.25
After receiving a message m ∈ {m∗}∪ ˘ M−i ∪M(i,t) and observing the realization xt of the action-stage
randomization device, any player hi,ti plays the action prescribed by the action-stage strategy described in
Deﬁnition A.9 with probability 1 − ε2(||A||i − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability ε2 each.
After receiving any message m 6∈ {m∗}∪ ˘ M−i∪M(i,t) and observing the realization xt of the action-stage
randomization device, any player hi,ti plays the action prescribed by the action-stage strategy described in
Deﬁnition A.9 with probability 1 − ε(||A||i − 1) and plays all other actions in Ai with probability ε each.
Deﬁnition A.13. Completely Mixed Message Strategies: Given ε, the completely mixed strategies for all
players hi,ti at the message stage are denoted by µt
i,ε and are deﬁned as follows.
Player hi,ti sends the message prescribed by the message-stage strategy described in Deﬁnition A.10 with
probability 1 − ε2n+1(||M
t+1
i || − 1) and sends all other messages in M
t+1
i with probability ε2n+1 each.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
Deﬁnition B.1: Let a proﬁle of message strategies µ be given. Fix an “augmented history” κt = (x0,a0,y0,
..., xt−1,at−1,yt−1). In other words, ﬁx a history ht, together with a sequence of realizations of the message-
stage randomization device (y0,...,yt−1). In what follows, κ0 will denote the null history ∅, and for any
τ ≤ t, κτ will denote the appropriate subset of κt.
For every i ∈ I let M0
i(m0


















25In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-deﬁning m0
i to be equal to m∗ for players hi ∈ I,0i.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ 27
So that Mt
i(mt
i|κt,µi) is the probability that player hi,t − 1i sends message mt
i given κt and the proﬁle µi.










Lemma B.1: Fix any δ ∈ (0,1), any ˜ x and any ˜ y. Fix any SE of the dynastic repeated game (g,µ,Φ).
Assume that it displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Deﬁnition 2.




i|κt,µi) > 0 be given.








Proof: We proceed by induction. Given the ﬁxed κt, let κ0 = ∅ and κτ with τ = 1,...,t be the augmented
histories comprising the ﬁrst three components (x0,a0,y0) of κt, the ﬁrst six components (x0,a0,y0,x1,a1,y1)






−i|κ0,µ−i) = 1 (B.3)
which is trivially true given that all players hi ∈ I,0i receive the null message by construction.
Our working hypothesis is now that the claim is true for an arbitrary τ − 1 < t − 1, and our task is to
show that it holds for τ.
Consider any message mτ
i in Supp(Mτ












i |κτ−1,µi) > 0 (B.4)
















































































26Supp(·) denotes the support of a probability distribution.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 28































and hence the claim is proved.
Deﬁnition B.2: Fix any δ ∈ (0,1), any ˜ x and any ˜ y. Fix any strategy proﬁle, (g,µ), for the dynastic
repeated game.
Consider the standard repeated game with the same common discount factor δ, and with the following
action-stage randomization device ˆ ˜ x. The random variable ˆ ˜ x takes values in the ﬁnite set Y × X (the sets
in which ˜ y and ˜ x take values respectively), and the probability that ˆ ˜ x is equal to ˆ x = (y,x) is Pr(˜ y = y)
Pr(˜ x = x). For notational convenience we will denote the realization ˆ xt of ˆ ˜ x
t
by the pair (yt−1,xt).
Recall that a history in the standard repeated game with randomization device ˆ ˜ x is an object of the
type ht = (ˆ x0,a0,..., ˆ xt−1,at−1). Therefore, using our notational convention about time superscripts of the
realizations of ˆ ˜ x
t
we have that any pair (ht, ˆ xt) can be written as a triple (y−1,κt,xt), where κt corresponds
to ht in the obvious way.
We say that the strategy proﬁle g∗ for the standard repeated game with randomization device ˆ ˜ x is derived
from the dynastic repeated game proﬁle (g,µ) as above if and only if it is deﬁned as follows.
gt∗










Lemma B.2: Fix any δ ∈ (0,1), any ˜ x and any ˜ y. Consider any SE, (g,µ), of the dynastic repeated game
that displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Deﬁnition 2.
Now consider the strategy proﬁle g∗ for the standard repeated game with randomization device ˆ ˜ x that is
derived from (g,µ) as in Deﬁnition B.2.
Given g∗, ﬁx any pair (ht, ˆ xt) representing a history and realized randomization device for the standard
repeated game. For any at
−i ∈ A−i, let Pg∗|ht,ˆ xt(at
−i) be the probability that the realized action proﬁle for
all players but i at time t is at
−i.
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Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of (B.11) of Deﬁnition B.2.
Lemma B.3: Fix any δ ∈ (0,1), any ˜ x and any ˜ y. Consider any SE (g,µ,Φ) of the dynastic repeated game
that displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Deﬁnition 2.
Fix any pair (ht, ˆ xt) representing a history and realized randomization device for the standard repeated
game. Given the pair (ht, ˆ xt), consider the corresponding triple (y−1,κt,xt) as in Deﬁnition B.2. Given the
last two elements of this triple (κt,xt), now use (B.1) to ﬁnd a message mt
i such that Mt
i(mt
i|κt,µi) > 0.





































the continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti given the proﬁle (g,µ), after he has received message mt
i has observed
the realization xt, and given that his beliefs over the n−1-tuple mt
−i are ΦtB















Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemma B.1 and of (2) of Deﬁnition 2. The details are omitted
for the sake of brevity.
B.1. Proof of the Theorem
Fix any δ ∈ (0,1), any ˜ x and any ˜ y. Consider any SE triple (g,µ,Φ) for the dynastic repeated game. Assume
that this SE displays Inter-Generational Agreement as in Deﬁnition 2.
Now consider the strategy proﬁle g∗ for the standard repeated game with common discount δ and ran-
domization device ˆ ˜ x that is derived from (g,µ) as in Deﬁnition B.2.
Since (g,µ) and g∗ obviously give rise to the same payoﬀ vector, to prove the claim it is enough to show
that g∗ is a SPE of the repeated game with δ and ˆ ˜ x. By way of contradiction, suppose that it is not.




−i|ht, ˆ xt) > vi(g∗|ht, ˆ xt) (B.16)
Given the pair (ht, ˆ xt), consider the corresponding triple (y−1,κt,xt) as in Deﬁnition B.2. Given the last
two elements of this triple (κt,xt), now use (B.1) to ﬁnd a message mt
i such that Mt
i(mt
i|κt,µi) > 0.



















where σi is the proﬁtable deviation identiﬁed in (B.16) and gt
i and µt
i are the alternative action-stage and
message-stage strategies of Lemma B.3.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 30













But since (B.18) contradicts the fact that (g,µ,Φ) is an SE of the dynastic repeated game, the proof is now
complete.
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T.1. Notation
Point of Notation T.1.1: Abusing the notation we established for the standard repeated game, we adopt
the following notation for continuation payoﬀs in the dynastic repeated game. Let an assessment (g,µ,Φ) be
given.
Recall that we denote by vt
i(g,µ|mt
i,xt,ΦtB
i ) the continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti given the proﬁle
(g,µ), after he has received message mt
i, has observed the realization xt, and given that his beliefs over the
n − 1-tuple mt
−i are ΦtB
i . In view of our discussion at the beginning of Section 3, it is clear that the only
component of the system of beliefs Φ that is relevant to deﬁne this continuation payoﬀ is in fact ΦtB
i . Our
discussion there also implies that the argument mt
i is redundant once ΦtB
i has been speciﬁed. We keep it in




i ) denote the continuation payoﬀ (viewed from the beginning of period
t + 1) to player hi,ti given the proﬁle (g,µ), after he has received message mt
i, has observed the triple
(xt,at,yt), and given that his beliefs over the n − 1-tuple m
t+1
−i are given by ΦtE
i . In view of our discussion
at the beginning of Section 3, it is clear that once ΦtE
i has been speciﬁed, the arguments (mt
i,xt,at,yt) are
redundant in determining the end-of-period continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti. Whenever this does not cause
any ambiguity (about ΦtE
i ) we will write vt
i(g,µ|ΦtE




As we noted in the text all continuation payoﬀs clearly depend on δ as well. To keep notation down this
dependence will be omitted whenever possible.
Point of Notation T.1.2: We will abuse our notation for ΦtB
i (·), ΦtE
i (·) and ΦtR
i (·) slightly in the following




to indicate their probabilities under these distributions.
So, for instance when we write ΦtB
i (mt
−i = (z,...,z)|mt
i) = c we mean that according to the beginning-of-
period beliefs of player hi,ti, after observing mt
i, the probability that mt
−i is equal to the n−1-tuple (z,...,z)
is equal to c.
Point of Notation T.1.3: Whenever the proﬁle (g,µ) is a proﬁle of completely mixed strategies, the beliefs
ΦtB
i (·), ΦtE
i (·) and ΦtR
i (·) are of course entirely determined by what player hi,ti observes and by (g,µ) using
Bayes’ rule. In this case, we will allow the pair (g,µ) to appear as a “conditioning event.”
So, for instance, ΦtB
i (mt
−i|mt
i, g,µ) is the probability of the n−1-tuple mt
−i, after mt
i has been received,
obtained from the completely mixed proﬁle (g,µ) via Bayes’ rule. Events may appear as arguments in this
case as well, consistently with our Point of Notation T.1.2 above.
Moreover, since the completely mixed pair (g,µ) determines the probabilities of all events, concerning
for instance histories, messages of previous cohorts and the like, we will use the notation Pr to indicate such
probabilities, using the pair (g,µ) as a conditioning event.
So, given any two events L and J, the notation Pr(L|J,g,µ) will indicate the probability of event L,
conditional on event J, as determined by the completely mixed pair (g,µ) via Bayes’ rule.
T.2. A Preliminary Result
As we mentioned before, we work with message spaces that are smaller than the set Ht. We now proceed to
show that this is without loss of generality.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum T.2
Deﬁnition T.2.1: Consider the dynastic repeated game described in full in Section 2. Now consider the
dynastic repeated game obtained from this when we restrict the message space of player hi,ti to be M
t+1
i ⊆
Ht+1, with all other details unchanged.
We call this the restricted dynastic repeated game with message spaces {Mt
i}i∈I,t≥1. For any given
δ ∈ (0,1), ˜ x and ˜ y, we denote by GD(δ, ˜ x, ˜ y,{Mt
i}i∈I,t≥1) the set of SE strategy proﬁles, while we write
ED(δ, ˜ x, ˜ y,{Mt
i}i∈I,t≥1) for the set of SE payoﬀ proﬁles of this dynastic repeated game with restricted message
spaces.
Lemma T.2.1: Let any δ ∈ (0,1), ˜ x and ˜ y be given. Consider now any restricted dynastic repeated game
with message spaces {Mt
i}i∈I,t≥1. Then ED(δ, ˜ x, ˜ y,{Mt
i}i∈I,t≥1) ⊆ ED(δ, ˜ x, ˜ y).
Proof: Let a proﬁle (g∗,µ∗) ∈ GD(δ, ˜ x, ˜ y,{Mt
i}i∈I,t≥1) with associated beliefs Φ∗ be given. To prove the
statement, we proceed to construct a new proﬁle (g∗∗,µ∗∗) ∈ GD(δ, ˜ x, ˜ y) and associated beliefs Φ∗∗ that are
consistent with (g∗∗,µ∗∗), and which gives every player the same payoﬀ as (g∗,µ∗).
Denote a generic element of Mt
i by zt
i. Since Mt
i ⊆ Ht, we can partition Ht into ||Mt
i|| non-empty mutually
exclusive exhaustive subsets, and make each of these subsets correspond to an element zt
i of Mt
i. In other










i ) ∩ ρt
i(zt00









We can now describe how the proﬁle (g∗∗,µ∗∗) is obtained from the given (g∗,µ∗). We deal ﬁrst with the















































































Similarly, concerning the end-of-period beliefs, for any player hi,ti, any (zt

































Since the proﬁle (g∗,µ∗) is sequentially rational given Φ∗, it is immediate from (T.2.1), (T.2.2), (T.2.3)
and (T.2.4) that the proﬁle (g∗∗,µ∗∗) is sequentially rational given Φ∗∗, and we omit further details of the
proof of this claim.
Of course, it remains to show that (g∗∗,µ∗∗,Φ∗∗) is a consistent assessment.
Let (g∗
ε,µ∗
ε) be parameterized completely mixed strategies which converge to (g∗,µ∗) and give rise, in the
limit as ε → 0, to beliefs Φ∗ via Bayes’ rule.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ T.3
Given any ε > 0, let (g∗∗
ε ,µ∗∗
ε ) be a proﬁle of completely mixed strategies obtained from (g∗
ε,µ∗
ε) exactly
as in (T.2.1) and (T.2.2).
We start by verifying the consistency of the beginning-of-period beliefs. Observe that for any given zt =
(zt
i,zt













































































Hence we have shown that the beginning-of-period beliefs as in (T.2.3) are consistent with (g∗∗,µ∗∗).
The proof that the end-of-period beliefs as in (T.2.4) are consistent with (g∗∗,µ∗∗) runs along exactly the
same lines, and we omit the details.
T.3. Proof of Theorem A.1: Beliefs
Deﬁnition T.3.1. Beginning-of-Period Beliefs: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not
equal to i.
The beginning-of-period beliefs of all players hi ∈ I,0i are trivial. Of course, all players believe that all
other players have received the null message m0
i = ∅.
The beginning-of-period beliefs ΦtB
i (mt
i) of any other player hi,ti, depending on the message he receives
from player hi,t − 1i are as followsT.1
if mt
i = m∗ then mt
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
if mt





−i−j= (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj) with pr. 1
mt
j ∈ M(j,t) with pr. 1
Pr(mt
j = mj,τ) > 0 ∀mj,τ ∈ M(j,t)
if mt
i = mj,τ then mt
−i = (mj,τ,...,mj,τ) with probability 1
if mt
i = mi,τ then mt
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) with probability 1
if mt
i = mk then mt
−i = (mk,...,mk) with probability 1
(T.3.1)
Deﬁnition T.3.2. End-of-Period Beliefs: Let k be any element of I, and j be any element of I not equal
to i.
We begin with period t = 0. Recall that m0





n,x0)), and deﬁne g0
−k(m0,x0) in the obvious way.
T.1Notice that the second line of (T.3.1) does not fully specify the probability distribution over the component mt
j of the beliefs
of player hi,ti. For the rest of the argument, what matters is only that all elements of M(j,t) have positive probability, and that
no message outside this set has positive probability. The distribution can be computed using Bayes’ rule from the equilibrium
strategies described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 above. We omit the details for the sake of brevity.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum T.4
Let Φ0E
i (m0
i,x0,a0,y0) be as follows
if a0 = g0(m0,x0) and y0 = y(j) then m1
−i−j = (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj),m1
j = mj,T with pr. 1
if a0 = g0(m0,x0) and y0 = y(i) then m1







−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with prob. 1
otherwise m1
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
(T.3.2)
Our next case is t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ > κ. Let x(`00,`∗) denote the realization of xt. For any
player hi,ti, let ΦtE
i (mt
i,x(`00,`∗),at,yt) be as followsT.2
if at = a(`∗) and mt






−i−j= (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj) with pr. 1
m
t+1
j ∈ M(j,t) with pr. 1
Pr(m
t+1
j = mj,τ) > 0 ∀mj,τ ∈ M(j,t)
if at = a(`∗) and mt
i = mj,τ then m
t+1
−i = (mj,τ,...,mj,τ) with probability 1
if at = a(`∗) and mt
i = mi,τ then m
t+1
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) with probability 1
if at = a(`∗) and mt
i = mk then m
t+1
−i = (mk,...,mk) with probability 1
if at
−k = a−k(`∗) and at
k 6= ak(`∗) then m
t+1
−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with probability 1
otherwise m
t+1
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
(T.3.3)
We divide the case of t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ into several subcases, according to which message
player hi,ti has received. We begin with mt
i = m∗. Let x(·, ˆ `,···) denote the realization of xt. For any player
hi,ti, with the understanding that mj,τ is a generic element of M(j,t + 1), let ΦtE
i (m∗,x(·, ˆ `,· · ·),at,yt) be
as follows




−i−j= (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj)
m
t+1
j = mj,τ with pr.
1
||M(j,t + 1)||
if at = a(ˆ `) and yt = y(i) then m
t+1
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) with probability 1
if at
−k = a−k(ˆ `) and at
k 6= ak(ˆ `) then m
t+1
−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with probability 1
otherwise m
t+1
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
(T.3.4)
The next subcase is that of mt
i = ˘ mj. Let x(···,j`,···) denote the realization of xt. With the understanding
that j0 is an element of I not equal to i and that mj
0,τ is a generic element of M(j0,t + 1), let ΦtE
i (˘ mj,x(· ·
·,j`,· · ·),at,yt) be as follows












0 ,τ with pr.
1
||M(j0,t + 1)||
if at = ˘ aj(j`) and yt = y(i) then m
t+1
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) with probability 1
if at
−k = ˘ a
j
−k(j`) and at




−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with probability 1
otherwise m
t+1
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
(T.3.5)
The next subcase is that of mt
i = mi,τ ∈ M(i,t). Let x(· · ·,i`,· · ·) denote the realization of xt. With the
T.2Similarly to (T.3.1), the ﬁrst line of (T.3.3) does not fully specify the probability distribution over the component mt+1
j of
the beliefs of player hi,ti. For the rest of the argument, what matters is only that all elements of M(j,t) have positive probability,
and that no message outside this set has positive probability. The distribution can be computed using Bayes’ rule from the
equilibrium strategies described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 above. We omit the details for the sake of brevity.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ T.5
understanding that mj,τ is a generic element of M(j,t + 1), let ΦtE
i (mi,τ,x(· · ·,i`,· · ·),at,yt) be as follows




−i−j= (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj)
m
t+1
j = mj,τ with pr.
1
||M(j,t + 1)||
if at = ˘ ai(i`) and yt = y(i) then m
t+1
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) with probability 1
if at
−k = ˘ ai
−k(i`) and at
k 6= ˘ ai
k(i`) then m
t+1
−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with probability 1
if at
−k = a−k(i`) and at
k 6= ak(i`) then m
t+1
−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with probability 1
if at = a(i`) then m
t+1
−i = (mi,τ−1,...,mi,τ−1) with probability 1
otherwise m
t+1
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
(T.3.6)
where we set mi,0 = mi.
The next subcase of t ≥ 1 and xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ that we consider is that of mt
i = mj,τ ∈ M(j,t).
Let x(· · ·,j`,· · ·) denote the realization of xt. Let ΦtE
i (mj,τ,x(· · ·,j`,· · ·),at,yt) be as follows
if at = a(j`) then m
t+1
−i = (mj,τ−1,...,mj,τ−1) with probability 1
if at
−k = a−k(j`) and at
k 6= ak(j`) then m
t+1
−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with probability 1
otherwise m
t+1
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
(T.3.7)
where we set mj,0 = mj.
The ﬁnal subcase to consider is that of mt
i = mk
0
for some k0 ∈ I. Let x(···,`k0,···) denote the realization
of xt. Let ΦtE
i (mk
0
,x(· · ·,`k0,· · ·),at,yt) be as follows






) with probability 1
if at
−k = a−k(`k0) and at
k 6= ak(`k0) then m
t+1
−i = (mk,T,...,mk,T) with probability 1
otherwise m
t+1
−i = (m∗,...,m∗) with probability 1
(T.3.8)
T.4. Proof of Theorem A.1: Sequential Rationality
Deﬁnition T.4.1: Let I ItE
i denote the end-of-period-t collection of information sets that belong to player
hi,ti, with typical element ItE
i .
It is convenient to partition I ItE
i into mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets on the basis of the associated
beliefs of player hi,ti. The fact that they exhaust I ItE
i can be checked directly from Deﬁnition T.3.2 above.
Let I ItE
i (∗) ⊂ I ItE
i be the collection of information sets in which player hi,ti believes that m
t+1
−i is equal
to (m∗,...,m∗) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (∗).
Let I ItE
i (˘i) ⊂ I ItE
i be the collection of information sets in which player hi,ti believes that m
t+1
−i is equal
to (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (˘i).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let I ItE
i (˘j,t) ⊂ I ItE
i be the collection of information sets in which
player hi,ti believes that m
t+1
−i−j is equal to (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj) with probability one, that Pr(m
t+1
j = mj,τ) > 0 ∀
mj,τ ∈ M(j,t), and that Pr(m
t+1
j ∈ M(j,t)) = 1.T.3 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (˘j,t).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let I ItE
i (˘j,t + 1) ⊂ I ItE
i be the collection of information sets in which
player hi,ti believes that m
t+1
−i−j is equal to (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj) with probability one, that Pr(m
t+1
j = mj,τ) =
||M(j,t + 1)||
−1 ∀ mj,τ ∈ M(j,t + 1). These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (˘j,t + 1).
For every k ∈ I, let I ItE
i (k) ⊂ I ItE
i be the collection of information sets in which player hi,ti believes that
m
t+1
−i is equal to (mk,...,mk) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (k).
For every k ∈ I, and every τ = max{T −t,1},...,T let I ItE
i (k,τ) ⊂ I ItE
i be the collection of information
sets in which player hi,ti believes that m
t+1
−i is equal to (mk,τ,...,mk,τ) with probability one. These beliefs
will be denoted by ΦtE
i (k,τ).
T.3See footnote T.2 above.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum T.6
Deﬁnition T.4.2: Let the strategy proﬁle (g,µ) described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 be given. Fix a
period t and an n-tuple of messages mt+1 = (m
t+1
1 ,...,mt+1




k for every k ∈ I.
Clearly, the proﬁle (g,µ) together with mt+1 uniquely determine a probability distribution over action
proﬁles over all future periods, beginning with t + 1.
Therefore, we can deﬁne the expected discounted (from the beginning of period t + 1) payoﬀ to player
hi,ti, given (g,µ) and mt+1 in the obvious way. This will be denoted by ¨ vt
i(mt+1). Moreover, since they play
a special role in some of the computations that follow, we reserve two pieces of notation for two particular
instances of mt+1. The expression ¨ vt
i(∗) stands for ¨ vt
i(mt+1) when mt+1 = (m∗,...,m∗). Moreover, for any
k ∈ I, the expression ¨ vt
i(k,τ) stands for ¨ vt
i(mt+1) when m
t+1
−k = (˘ mk,... ˘ mk) and m
t+1
k = mk,τ ∈ M(k,t+1).





q ˆ ˆ vi + (1 − q)zi
i
+ δ q v∗
i








i + (1 − q)zi

+ δ q v∗
i
1 − δ (1 − q)
(T.4.2)
where ¨ vt
i(∗) and ¨ vt
i(k,τ) are as in Deﬁnition T.4.2, ˆ ˆ vi is as in (A.7), zi is as in Remark A.4, v∗
i is as in the
statement of the Theorem, and ˘ uk
i is as in (A.4).
Proof: Assume ﬁrst that t ≥ T. Using Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 we can write ¨ vt






(1 − δ)ˆ ˆ vi + δ
"


























(1 − δ)˘ uk
i + δ
"






















Since the strategy proﬁle (g,µ) described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 is stationary for t ≥ T, we imme-
diately have that ¨ vt
i(∗) = ¨ v
t+1
i (∗) and, for any k ∈ I and any τ = 1,...,T, ¨ vt
i(k,τ) = ¨ v
t+1
i (k,τ). Hence we
can solve (T.4.3) and (T.4.4) simultaneously for the NT + 1 variables ¨ vt
i(∗) and ¨ vt
i(k,τ) (k ∈ I and τ =
1,...,T). Using (A.8) this immediately gives (T.4.1) and (T.4.2), as required.
Proceeding by induction backwards from t = T, it is also immediate to verify that the statement holds
for any t < T. The details are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Lemma T.4.2: Let the strategy proﬁle (g,µ) and system of beliefs Φ described in Deﬁnitions A.9, A.10,
T.3.1 and T.3.2 be given. Then the end-of-period continuation payoﬀs for any player hi,ti (discounted as of
the beginning of period t + 1) at any information set It
i ∈ I ItE







q ˆ ˆ vi + (1 − q)zi
i
+ δ q v∗
i








i + (1 − q)zi

+ δ q v∗
i




i (˘j,t)) = vt
i(g,µ|ΦtE





i + (1 − q)zi
i
+ δ q v∗
i
1 − δ (1 − q)
∀j 6= i (T.4.7)
vt
i(g,µ|ΦtE
i (k)) = q vk








1 − δ(1 − q)
τ
qωk





1 − δ(1 − q)
τ 
qvk
i + (1 − q)zi

∀k ∈ I ∀τ = max{T − t,1},...,T
(T.4.9)
where ˆ ˆ vi is as in (A.7), zi is as in Remark A.4, v∗
i is as in the statement of the Theorem, ˘ uk
i is as in (A.4),
and ωk
i is as in (A.3).
Proof: Equations (T.4.5), (T.4.6) and (T.4.7) are a direct consequence of Deﬁnition T.4.1 and Lemma T.4.1.
Equation (T.4.8) follows directly from Deﬁnition T.4.1 and the description of the proﬁle (g,µ) in Deﬁni-
tions A.9 and A.10.
Using the notation established in Deﬁnition T.4.2, consider the quantity ¨ vt
i(mk,τ,...,mk,τ). Given the
strategies described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 it is evident that this quantity does not depend on t. There-
fore, for any k ∈ I and τ = max{T − t,1},...,T, we can let ¨ vi(k,τ) = ¨ vt
i(mk,τ,...,mk,τ), for all t. Clearly,
using Deﬁnition T.4.1, we have that for all k, τ and t, vt
i(g,µ|ΦtE
i (k,τ)) = ¨ vi(k,τ).
From the description of (g,µ) in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10, for any k ∈ I and for any τ = 2,...,T, the
quantity ¨ vi(k,τ) obeys a diﬀerence equation as follows.
¨ vi(k,τ) = q

(1 − δ)ωk
i + δ¨ vi(k,τ − 1)

+ (1 − q)[(1 − δ)zi + δ¨ vi(k,τ)] (T.4.10)
Using again Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10, the terminal condition for (T.4.10) is




i + (1 − q)zi]

+ (1 − q)[(1 − δ)zi + δ¨ vi(k,1)] (T.4.11)
Solving (T.4.10) and imposing the terminal condition (T.4.11) now yields (T.4.9), as required.
Purely for expositional convenience, before completing the proof of sequential rationality at the message
stage, we now proceed with the argument that establishes sequential rationality at the action stage.
Deﬁnition T.4.3: Recall that at the action stage, player hi,ti chooses an action after having received a
message mt
i and having observed a realization xt of the randomization device ˜ xt.
T.4See our Point of Notation T.1.1 above.A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum T.8
Let I ItB
i denote period-t action-stage collection of information sets that belong to player hi,ti, with typical
element ItB
i . Clearly, each element of I ItB
i is identiﬁed by a pair (mt
i,xt).
It is convenient to partition I ItB
i into mutually disjoint exhaustive subsets. The fact that they exhaust
I ItB
i can be checked directly from Deﬁnition T.3.1 above.
Let I ItB
i (∗) ⊂ I ItB
i be the collection of information sets in which player hi,ti believes that mt
−i is equal
to (m∗,...,m∗) with probability one.T.5 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (∗).
Let I ItB
i (˘i) ⊂ I ItB
i be the collection of information sets in which player hi,ti believes that mt
−i is equal
to (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (˘i).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, let I ItB
i (˘j) ⊂ I ItB
i be the collection of information sets in which player hi,ti
believes that mt
−i−j is equal to (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj) with probability one, that Pr(mt
j = mj,τ) > 0 ∀ mj,τ ∈ M(j,t),
and that Pr(mt
j ∈ M(j,t)) = 1.T.6 These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (˘j).
For every j ∈ I not equal to i, and every τ = max{T −t+1,1},...,T let I ItB
i (j,τ) ⊂ I ItB
i be the collection
of information sets in which player hi,ti believes that mt
−i is equal to (mj,τ,...,mj,τ) with probability one.
These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtB
i (j,τ).
For every k ∈ I, let I ItB
i (k) ⊂ I ItB
i be the collection of information sets in which player hi,ti believes that
mt
−i is equal to (mk,...,mk) with probability one. These beliefs will be denoted by ΦtE
i (k).
Lemma T.4.3: There exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that whenever δ > δ the action-stage strategies described in
Deﬁnition A.9 are sequentially rational given the beliefs described in Deﬁnition T.3.1 for every player hi,ti.T.7
Proof: Consider any information set ItB
i ∈ {I ItB
i (∗) ∪ I ItB
i (˘i) ∪ I ItB
i (˘j)}.T.8
Using Deﬁnition A.9, Lemma T.4.2 and Deﬁnition T.4.3, it is immediate to check that, as δ → 1, the limit
expected continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti from following the action-stage strategies described in Deﬁnition
A.9 at any of these information sets is
v∗
i = qˆ vi + (1 − q)zi (T.4.12)
In the same way, it can be checked that, as δ → 1, the limit expected continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti from
deviating at any of these information sets is
qvi
i + (1 − q)zi (T.4.13)
Since by assumption ˆ vi > vi
i this is of course suﬃcient to prove our claim for any information set ItB
i ∈
{I ItB
i (∗) ∪ I ItB
i (˘i) ∪ I ItB
i (˘j)}.
Now consider any information set ItB
i either in I ItB
i (j,τ) or in I ItB
i (j) (with j 6= i).
Using Deﬁnition A.9, Lemma T.4.2 and Deﬁnition T.4.3, it is immediate to check that, as δ → 1, the limit
expected continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti from following the action-stage strategies described in Deﬁnition
A.9 at any of these information sets is
qv
j
i + (1 − q)zi (T.4.14)
T.5In the interest of brevity, we avoid an explicit distinction between the t = 0 players and all others. What follows can be
interpreted as applying to all players re-deﬁning m0
i to be equal to m∗ for players hi ∈ I,0i.
T.6See footnote T.1.
T.7It should be understood that we are, for now, taking it as given that each player hi,ti follows the prescriptions of the
message-stage strategies described in Deﬁnition A.10. Of course, we have not demonstrated yet that this is in fact sequentially
rational given the beliefs described in Deﬁnition T.3.2. We will come back to this immediately after the current lemma is proved.
T.8See Deﬁnition T.4.3.Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ T.9
In the same way, it can be checked that, as δ → 1, the limit expected continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti from
deviating at any of these information sets is exactly as in (T.4.13).
Since by assumption for any j 6= i we have that v
j
i > vi
i this is of course suﬃcient to prove our claim for
any of these information sets.
To conclude the proof of the lemma, we now consider any information set ItB
i ∈ I ItB
i (i). Using Deﬁnition
A.9, Lemma T.4.2 and Deﬁnition T.4.3, it can be checked that the expected continuation payoﬀ to player
hi,ti from following the action-stage strategies described in Deﬁnition A.9 at any of these information sets is
bounded below by
(1 − δ)ui + δ

qvi
i + (1 − q)zi

(T.4.15)
In the same way it can be readily seen that the expected continuation payoﬀ to player hi,ti from deviating
at any of these information sets is bounded above by














1 − δ (1 − q)
T 
qvi
i + (1 − q)zi

) (T.4.16)
The diﬀerence given by (T.4.15) minus (T.4.16) can be written as
(1 − δ)

    














− (ui − ui)

    
    
(T.4.17)
















− (ui − ui) = T(vi
i − ωi
i) − (ui − ui) (T.4.18)
Using (A.12), we know that the quantity on the right-hand side of (T.4.18) is strictly positive. Hence we can
conclude our claim is valid at any information set ItB
i ∈ I ItB
i (i).
Lemma T.4.4: Consider the notation we established in Deﬁnition T.4.2. For any given t and τ = max{T −
t,1},...,T let ¨ vt
i(m,mi,τ) denote ¨ vt





−i = (mi,τ,...,mi,τ). As in the proof of Lemma T.4.2, let ¨ vi(i,τ) = ¨ vt
i(mi,τ,...,mi,τ).
Then there exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that whenever δ > δ for every player hi,ti, for every m ∈ M
t+1
i , and
for every τ = max{T − t,1},...,T
¨ vi(i,τ) ≥ ¨ vt
i(m,mi,τ) (T.4.19)
Proof: We prove the claim for the case t ≥ T. The treatment of t < T has some completely non-essential
complications due to the fact that the players’ message spaces increase in size for the ﬁrst T periods. The
details are are omitted for the sake of brevity.
We now introduce a new random random variable ˜ w, independent of ˜ x and ˜ y (see Deﬁnitions A.5 and
A.6), and uniformly distributed over the ﬁnite set {1,...,T}. This will be used in the rest of the proof ofA “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum T.10
the lemma to keep track of the “private” randomization across messages that members of dynasty i may
be required to perform (see Deﬁnition A.10). Just as we did for the action-stage and the message-stage
randomization devices, we consider countably many independent “copies” of ˜ w, one for each time period,
denoted by ˜ wt, with typical realization wt.
To keep track of all “future randomness” looking ahead for t0 = 1,2,... periods from t, it will also be











A typical realization of ˜ st,t
0








)]. The set of
all possible realizations of ˜ st,t
0
(which obviously does not depend on t) is denoted by St
0
.
Recall that the proﬁle (g,µ) described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 is taken as given throughout. Now
suppose that in period t, player hi,ti sends a generic message m ∈ M
t+1
i and that m
t+1
−i = (mi,τ,...,mi,τ).
Then, given any realization st,t
0
we can compute the actual action proﬁle played by all players hk ∈ I,t+t0i.













Recall that the messages received by all time-t + t0 players are the result of choices and random draws
















, ˆ ˆ y
t+t
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, ˆ ˆ w
t+t
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Notice next that from the description of the proﬁle (g,µ) in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 it is also immediate
to check that for any t0, any m ∈ M
t+1
i and any realization st,t
0


















) for some τ0 = 1,...,T.
Lastly, notice that, given an arbitrary message m ∈ M
t+1
i we can write
¨ vt















Since the strategies described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 are stationary for t ≥ T, and the distribution
of ˜ st,t
0
is independent of t, it is evident from (T.4.22) that ¨ vt
i(m,mi,τ) does not depend on t. From now on
we drop the superscript and write ¨ vi(m,mi,τ).
We now proceed with the proof of inequality (T.4.19) of the statement of the lemma. In order to do so,
from now on we ﬁx a particular t = ˆ t, m = ˆ m and τ = ˆ τ, and we prove (T.4.19) for these ﬁxed values of t, m
and τ. Since the lower bound on δ that we will ﬁnd will clearly not depend on t, and since there are ﬁnitely
many values that m and τ can take, this will be suﬃcient to prove the claim.
Inequality (T.4.19) in the statement of the lemma is trivially satisﬁed (as an equality) if m = mi,τ. From
now on assume that ˆ m and ˆ τ are such that ˆ m 6= mi,ˆ τ.
Given any t0 = 1,2,..., we now partition the set of realizations St
0











5 . This will allow us to decompose the right-hand side of (T.4.22) in a way that will


















) for some τ0 = 1,..., ˆ τ} (T.4.23)Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ T.11















































































































































) = (mi,..., mi). Therefore, it is clear
that St
0







The last set in the partition of St
0














Using (T.4.22), we can now proceed to compare the two sides of inequality (T.4.19) of the statement of
















2 , we know immediately from (T.4.24) that there is nothing to prove.










1 , then it follows from (T.4.21)
and (T.4.23) that any s
ˆ t,t
0



















































Therefore, since the s
ˆ t,t
0
that we ﬁxed is an arbitrary element of St
0
































)) (T.4.30)A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum T.12





3 . Using, (T.4.25), (T.4.26) and (T.4.27), and Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 we get that
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− (ui − ui)

    
    
(T.4.33)
Notice now that we know that the quantity in (T.4.33) is in fact positive for δ suﬃciently close to 1. This is
simply because the term in curly brackets in (T.4.33) is the same as the right-hand side of (T.4.18). Therefore,










). Since t0 is




4 for all possible values of t0.










5 , then it follows from
(T.4.21) and (T.4.28) that any s
ˆ t,t
0











) is in fact in St
0
5 .


















i + (1 − q)zi >
qωi



















Therefore, since the s
ˆ t,t
0
that we ﬁxed is an arbitrary element of St
0

































Hence, the proof of the lemma is now complete.
Remark T.4.1: Let the strategy proﬁle (g,µ) described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 be given. Consider a
player hi,ti, and a realization of future uncertainty st,t
0
as deﬁned in the proof of Lemma T.4.4.
Let any message m ∈ M
t+1
i be given, and ﬁx any information set ItE
i and associated beliefs ΦtE
i (·).
It is then clear from Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 and T.4.1, that for any t0 the action that player hi,ti
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Lemma T.4.5: There exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that whenever δ > δ the message-stage strategies described in
Deﬁnition A.10 are sequentially rational given the beliefs described in Deﬁnition T.3.2 for every player hi,ti.
Proof: Consider any information set ItE
i ∈ I ItE
i (i,τ), where I ItE
i (i,τ) is as in Deﬁnition T.4.1. It is then
evident from Lemma T.4.4 and from the beliefs ΦtE
i (i,τ) described in Deﬁnition T.4.1 that for δ suﬃciently
close to 1, the message strategies described in Deﬁnition A.10 are sequentially rational at any such information
set.
From now on, consider any information set ItE
i 6∈ I ItE
i (i,τ). Let m ∈ M
t+1
i be the message that player
hi,ti should send according to the strategy µt
i, and let ˆ m be any other message in M
t+1
i . Consider a particular
realization st,t
0
, and for any t00 ∈ {1,...,t0 − 1}, let st,t
00
denote the ﬁrst t00 triples of st,t
0
.

























i ) for every t00 ∈ {1,...,t0 − 1}.
Clearly, in periods {t + 1,...,t0 − 1}, conditional on st,t
0
, the payoﬀ to player hi,ti is unaﬀected by the
deviation to ˆ m. Now consider the payoﬀ to player hi,ti, conditional on st,t
0
, from the beginning of period t0
on, for simplicity discounted from the beginning of period t0. If player hi,ti sends message m as prescribed
by µt
i, and δ is close enough to 1, the payoﬀ in question is bounded below by
(1 − δ)ui + δ(qvi
i + (1 − q)zi) (T.4.36)
Now consider the payoﬀ to player hi,ti if he sends message ˆ m, conditional on st,t
0
, from the beginning of
period t0 on, for simplicity discounted from the beginning of period t0. In period t0 the action played cannot
yield him more than ui. From Lemma T.4.4, we know that, for δ close enough to 1, from the beginning of
period t0 +1 the payoﬀ is bounded above by ¨ vi(i,T). Hence, for δ close enough to 1, using (T.4.9) the payoﬀ
in question is bounded above by














1 − δ(1 − q)
T
qvi




Notice now that the quantity in (T.4.36) is the same as the quantity in (T.4.15), and the quantity in (T.4.37)
is in fact the same as the quantity in (T.4.16). Hence, exactly as in the proof of Lemma T.4.3, we know that,
for δ suﬃciently close to 1, the quantity in (T.4.36) is greater than the quantity in (T.4.37). This is clearly
enough to conclude the proof.
T.5. Proof of Theorem A.1: Consistency of Beliefs
Remark T.5.1: Let (gε,µε) be the completely mixed strategy proﬁle of Deﬁnitions A.12 and A.13. It is
then straightforward to check that as ε → 0 the proﬁle (gε,µε) converges pointwise (in fact uniformly) to the
equilibrium strategy proﬁle described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10, as required.
Lemma T.5.1: The strategy proﬁle (g,µ) described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 and the beginning-of-period
beliefs described in Deﬁnition T.3.1 are consistent.
Proof: When t = 0, there is nothing to prove. Assume t ≥ 1. We consider two cases. First assume that
player hi,ti receives message m ∈ {m∗} ∪ ˘ M−i ∪ M(i,t). Clearly, this is on the equilibrium path generated
by the proﬁle of strategies (g,µ) described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10. Therefore, consistency in this case
simply requires checking that the beginning-of-period beliefs described in Deﬁnition T.3.1 are obtained via
Bayes’ rule from the proﬁle (g,µ). This is a routine exercise, and we omit the details.
Now assume that player hi,ti receives message m 6∈ {m∗} ∪ ˘ M−i ∪ M(i,t). From Deﬁnition T.3.1 it is
immediate to check that in this case player hi,ti assigns probability one to the event that mt
−i = (m,...,m).A “Super” Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games: Technical Addendum T.14
Given (g,µ), this event may of course have been generated by several possible histories. Notice however, that
the proﬁle (g,µ) is such that a single deviation by one player at the action stage is suﬃcient to generate the
message proﬁle mt = (m,...,m). Therefore, upon observing m 6∈ {m∗} ∪ ˘ M−i ∪ M(i,t) the probability that
mt
−i = (m,...,m) is an inﬁnitesimal in ε of order no higher than 2. This needs to be compared with the
probability that mt
−i 6= (m,...,m) and mt
i = m. The latter event is impossible given the proﬁle (g,µ) unless
a deviation at the message stage has occurred at some point. Therefore its probability is an inﬁnitesimal in
ε of order no lower than 2n + 1. This is obviously enough to prove the claim.
Lemma T.5.2: The strategy proﬁle (g,µ) described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 and the end-of-period beliefs
described in Deﬁnition T.3.2 are consistent.
Proof: The case t = 0 is trivial. Assume t ≥ 1, and consider any player hi,ti after having observed
(mt
i,xt,at,yt).
We deal ﬁrst with the case in which xt = x(κ) with κ > κ. Let x(`00,`∗) denote the realization xt.
In this case, the action-stage strategies described in Deﬁnition A.9 prescribe that every player hk ∈ I,ti
should play at
k(`∗). Therefore, if the observed action proﬁle at is equal to a(`∗), player hi,ti does not revise
his beginning-of-period beliefs during period t. Hence consistency in this case follows immediately from the
proﬁle µ and from the consistency of beginning-of-period beliefs, which of course was proved in Lemma T.5.1.
Notice now that if at 6= a(`∗), then the message strategies described in Deﬁnition A.10 prescribe that each
player hk ∈ I,ti should send a message that does not depend on the message mt
k he received. Hence, in this
case consistency is immediate from Deﬁnition T.3.2 and the proﬁle µ.
We now turn to the case in which xt = x(κ) with κ ≤ κ. Here, it is necessary to consider several subcases,
depending on the message m received by player hi,ti. Assume ﬁrst that m 6∈ ˘ M−i ∪ M(i,t). Then for any




−i = (m,...,m) | mt
i = m,xt,at,gε,µε) = 1 (T.5.1)
To see this consider two sets of possibilities. First, m = m∗, xt = x(·, ˆ `,· · ·), and at = (a1(ˆ `), ...,an(ˆ `)).
Then play is as prescribed by the equilibrium path generated by the proﬁle (g,µ), and from Deﬁnitions A.9
and A.10 there is nothing more to prove. For all other possibilities, notice that the event mt = (m,...,m) is
consistent with any at together with n deviations at the action stage of the second type described in Deﬁnition
A.12. Therefore, for any at, the probability of mt = (m,...,m) and at is an inﬁnitesimal in ε of order no
higher than 2n. On the other hand, from Deﬁnition A.13 it is immediate that the probability that mt
−i 6=
(m,...,m) (since it requires at least one deviation at the message stage) is an inﬁnitesimal in ε of order no
lower than 2n + 1. Hence (T.5.1) follows. From (T.5.1) it is a matter of routine to check the consistency of
end-of-period beliefs from using the proﬁle (g,µ). We omit the details.





−i−j = (˘ mj,..., ˘ mj) and mt
j ∈ M(j,t) | mt
i = ˘ mj,xt,at,gε,µε) = 1 (T.5.2)
using an argument completely analogous to the one we used for (T.5.1). The details are omitted. As in the
previous case, from (T.5.2) it is a matter of routine to check the consistency of end-of-period beliefs from
using the proﬁle (g,µ).









−i = (mi,τ,...,mi,τ) | mt
i = mi,τ,xt,at,gε,µε) = 1
(T.5.3)Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, and Roger Lagunoﬀ T.15
Again, the argument is completely analogous to the one used for (T.5.1) and (T.5.2), and the details are
omitted. Now take (T.5.3) as given and let xt = x(· · ·,i`,· · ·).
Suppose next that at
−i = ˘ ai
−i(i`). Then player hi,ti does not revise his beginning-of-period beliefs,
and hence, using the proﬁle µ and Lemma T.5.1 it is immediate to check that his end-of-period beliefs are
consistent in this case.
Now suppose that for some j 6= i we have that at
j 6= ˘ ai
j(i`) and at
−i−j = ˘ ai
−i−j(i`). Consistency of beliefs
in this case requires showing that the ﬁrst element in the sum in (T.5.3) is equal to 1. Of course given (T.5.3)
it suﬃces to compare the probabilities of the two events mt
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) and mt
−i = (mi,τ,...,mi,τ).
The ﬁrst is compatible with a single deviation at the action stage on the part of player hj,ti. Therefore its
probability is an inﬁnitesimal in ε of order no higher than 2. The latter requires an action-stage deviation
in some period t0 < t (order 2 in ε), and n − 2 action-stage deviations in period t (order 1 each). Hence,
player hi,ti has consistent beliefs if he assigns probability 1 to mt
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi). The consistency of his
end-of-period beliefs can then be checked from the proﬁle µ.




−i−j(i`). Consistency of beliefs in
this case requires showing that the second element in the sum in (T.5.3) is equal to 1. Of course given (T.5.3)
it suﬃces to compare the probabilities of the two events mt
−i = (˘ mi,..., ˘ mi) and mt
−i = (mi,τ,...,mi,τ).
The ﬁrst requires (n − 2) deviations at the action-stage of period t, each of order 2 in ε. Since n ≥ 4, this is
therefore an inﬁnitesimal in ε of order no lower than 4. The second is consistent with a deviation of order 2
in ε at the action-stage of some period t0 < t, together with a deviation of order 1 in ε at the action stage of
period t. Therefore its probability is an inﬁnitesimal in ε of order no higher than 3. Hence, player hi,ti has
consistent beliefs if he assigns probability 1 to mt
−i = (mi,τ,...,mi,τ). The consistency of his end-of-period
beliefs can then be checked from the proﬁle µ. The same argument applies to show the consistency of his
end-of-period beliefs when at
−i = ai
−i(i`). We omit the details.
In all other possible cases for at, the messages sent by all players hj 6= i,ti do not in fact depend on at,
provided that mt
j is either ˘ mi or mi,τ. Given (T.5.3), the consistency of the end-of-period beliefs of player
hi,ti can then be checked directly from the proﬁle µ.
T.6. Proof of Theorem A.1
Given any v∗ ∈ int(V ) and any δ ∈ (0,1), using (A.9), (A.8) and the strategies and randomization devices
described in Deﬁnitions A.5, A.6, A.9 and A.10 clearly implement the payoﬀ vector v∗.
From Lemmas T.4.3 and T.4.5 we know that there exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that whenever δ > δ each
strategy in the proﬁle described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10 is sequentially rational given the beliefs described
in Deﬁnitions T.3.1 and T.3.2.
From Lemmas T.5.1 and T.5.2 we know that the strategy proﬁle described in Deﬁnitions A.9 and A.10
and the beliefs described in Deﬁnitions T.3.1 and T.3.2 are consistent.
Hence, using Lemma T.2.1, the proof of Theorem A.1 is now complete.